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There has been an increase in the integration of global agricultural value chains in recent 
decades.  This trend has created opportunities for smallholder farmers and agrifood industries 
in developing countries through forms of international exchange. At the same time, 
demographic changes and rising incomes across the developing world have affected the food 
security status of citizens in developing countries. Institutions have a prominent role to play in 
how integrated countries and smallholder farmers are in global value chains. This dissertation 
seeks to answer these questions first by studying coconut value chains.  The first paper does 
this by first on a macro level by analyzing the role of institutions on the trade of coconut 
products. Second, I study a case study in Fiji qualitatively to understand the discourses and 
perceptions of farmers involved in coconut farming.  Finally, the third paper takes a theoretical 
model to assess the effects of a transition of rural smallholder farming to selling or renting 
landholdings and supplying labor to larger commercial farms on the food security and economic 
welfare of in-country urban consumers.  In line with the two previous papers, it emphasizes the 
importance of institutions since positive and negative institutional forces within the home 
country play a part in the persistence of smallholder farming. 
Chapter 2 presents the first paper, titled “The role of institutional quality on the performance in 
the export of coconut products.” It aimed to answer three research questions.  First, we are 
interested in how the overall institutional environment in exporting countries affects the 
bilateral trade of coconut products.  Second, we look into whether improvements in the 
exporters’ individual indicator scores lead to an increase in trade with consideration to the 
exporters’ and importers’ overall institutional setting.  Lastly, we investigate the effects of 
institutional similarities for coconut trade and its different compositions of value addition. To 
address these questions, we utilized structural gravity models to measure how institutional 
quality affects the trade performance of the top 26 coconut producing countries to the top 15 
importing economies over the span of 20 years. The results suggest that increased government 
effectiveness enhances trade of high-value products, whereas better voice and accountability 
scores decrease the trade of coconut products in both categories of value addition. 
The second paper, presented in Chapter 3, investigates the coconut value chain in Fiji. It is titled 
“Fiji’s participation in the global coconut value chain: Opportunities and constraints.”  Field 
research was conducted in the islands of Fiji. I use predominately a qualitative approach to 
understand the rhetoric and discourses of each stakeholder group involved in the coconut sector 
and their perceptions of the challenges and opportunities.  This chapter then follows the first 




coconut products from Fiji. The empirical results show that increased scores in the 
government's effectiveness and voice and accountability indicators enhance coconut exports 
from Fiji, suggesting that domestic institutions play an important role. Interviews with key 
actors reveal that communications among each stakeholder group are fragmented. The main 
institutional actors and the producers have different perceptions of the industry’s challenges, 
thus resulting in different ideas on how to address the issues.     
Chapter 4 of this dissertation is titled “Modern agricultural value chains and food security of 
urban consumers in developing countries.”  The work is a collaboration stemmed from my 
research stay at the University of California Davis. The study builds on previous research (Ma 
& Sexton, forthcoming) that assessed the future of smallholder farming systems in modern 
agricultural value chains. Their findings show that smallholders gain higher incomes and larger 
production outputs when they can supply inputs and labor to large commercial farms compared 
to working on own small farms across a range of plausible market settings. We address the 
unanswered question of how this improved productivity effect can affect the welfare and food 
security of domestic smallholders and urban consumers. We obtain price elasticities of demand 
for staple food commodities in developing countries from 15 peer-reviewed articles.  Based on 
these figures, we embed a demand-side framework into the Ma-Sexton model to study the 
impacts of land consolidation and the advent of commercial farming systems on the dietary 
diversity of home country urban consumers.  
Some general conclusions and implications can be drawn from the results of these chapters.  
First, we confirm that institutions matter, but not merely as one entity.  Different aspects of 
institutional quality affect integration differently.  When assessing coconut producing countries 
collectively, the findings of our first paper suggest that government effectiveness matters the 
most when enhancing trade of coconut products of varying degrees of value edition, while the 
indicator, voice and accountability, had contrasting effects.  However, chapter 3 demonstrates 
that for Fiji, a small island economy, both government effectiveness and voice and 
accountability increase Fiji’s export of coconut products.  This implies that the heterogeneities 
of each country play a role and must be taken into consideration for future research.    Each 
country has its specific institutional set-up and enabling environment.  The integration of each 
country will differ albeit to a lesser or greater degree than another. 
Findings from the last paper suggest that urban consumers, especially the poorer households, 
can benefit when prices of staple crops increase.  Their overall welfare and diet improve as a 
result. Smallholders also see an improvement in welfare as the utility in consumption and 




development in mind when implementing policies and strategies that support smallholder 
farming, our findings suggest that there is a large welfare gain if policies enable smallholders 
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In recent years, the world has seen a transformation of the agrifood industry. In particular, there 
has been a rise in the integration of agricultural value chains. The importance of high-value 
agricultural tradeable goods from developing countries has been increasing.  For example, the 
export volumes of these products have increased by 14% from 1980 to 2010 in South and 
Southeast Asia, and by 17% in Latin America (Maertens & Swinnen, 2015). Combined with 
trade liberalization, the export market for these products has become more integrated (Gulati et 
al., 2007). This trend has created opportunities for smallholder farmers and agri-food industries 
in developing countries through forms of international exchange.  Reardon et al. (2003) argue 
that one of the driving forces for the transformation comes from demand-side aspects, such as 
increasing income, urbanization, and decreasing transaction costs for consumers due to better 
infrastructure.  Demographic changes and rising incomes throughout the world have an overall 
effect on the food security status of developing countries.  These developments have led to 
modernized food chains that entail attention to production methods, quality assurance, food 
safety standards (Maertens et al., 2012).  
While smallholder farmers in low-income countries engage in much of the agricultural 
production, they still face a string of challenges that keep them from participating in 
opportunities in the market (Bitzer, 2012)  Institutions play a role in how well countries 
integrate throughout this process. There is no shortage of studies that link institutions and 
development. They range from the relationship between institutions and economic development 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005; Mauro, 1995), foreign direct investment (FDI) (Daude & Stein, 2007), 
productivity (Fulginiti et al., 2004; Lio & Liu, 2008), trade (Álvarez et al., 2018; Belloc, 2006; 
Francois & Manchin, 2013), and participation in global value chains (Dollar & Kidder, 2017; 
Kowalski et al., 2015).  Past research suggests that small and remote economies can benefit 
from integrating into global value chains (Breisinger et al., 2019; Kowalski et al., 2015; Streeten, 
1993).  At the same time, institutions and policies in home countries can hinder this process by 
implementing distortions such as subsidies. 
Some research has focused on the consolidation of modern supply chains driven by the rise of 
supermarkets (Reardon et al., 2003). Yet, no study looks into the effects of institutional factors 
on the integration of products with different levels of value-addition. Since high-value 
agricultural products are increasingly becoming more integrated into global value chains, it is 
worth looking at the forces that contribute to this growth.  




This dissertation tackles this topic in three different analyses. This is done first on a macro level 
by analyzing the role of institutions on the trade of coconut products, as presented in chapter 2. 
The analysis takes the World Bank’s world governance indicators (WGI) and assesses their 
influence on the export performance of coconut products. The research from chapter 3 involves 
field studies in Fiji. Qualitative methods are utilized to understand the discourses of farmers 
involved in coconut farming.  Chapter 4 looks into the effects of a transition of rural smallholder 
farming to selling or renting landholdings and supplying labor to larger commercial farms on 
the food security and economic welfare of in-country urban consumers. Consistent with the two 
previous chapters, the importance of institutions is highlighted as institutional forces within the 
home country contribute to the reasons why smallholder farming persists. We utilize a 
theoretical model and parameterizes it based on empirical literature to simulate the result of the 
effects of a transition of rural smallholder farming to selling or renting landholdings and 
supplying labor to larger commercial farms on the food security and economic welfare in in-
country urban consumers. The final chapter concludes and discusses policy implications and 
limitations in the chapters of the dissertation as well as prospects for future research. 
1.1Defining institutions 
The concept of institutions can be defined in various manners. For the purpose of this 
dissertation’s analysis, I refer to institutions after North’s definition (1991, p. 97) as “the 
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions”.  The 
main concern is in what North (1991) refers to as the “formal rules” of institutions, which are 
constitutions, laws, and property rights. These formal rules affect the transaction costs that arise 
during the production of goods and economic exchanges across international borders. 
According to North and Thomas (1973), the explanation for differences in economic growth 
lies in institutions.  Note that the focus here is not on informal institutions such as social 
networks, though, their effects cannot be ignored.  
The notion of institutions throughout this dissertation is closely linked to that of “governance”. 
Some authors have used the two terms interchangeably (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2008). Institutions, 
in this case, is both an economic and political concept. Acemoglu et al. (2005) discuss economic 
institutions as the foundations of economic growth since they incentivize economic actors, 
which explains disparities across countries. They also note that economic institutions are 
implicitly determined by political power because there are competing interests in the 
distribution of resources which often ends in a zero-sum game.  The authors separate between 
two types of political power, de jure, which is allocated by political institutions, and de facto 




political power, determined by the power given by political institutions in society i.e. the forms 
of government (Acemoglu et al., 2005).  The authors illustrate the importance of political power 
and economic institutions with the example of North and South Korea post World War II. 
Despite similar geographical, cultural, and economic features immediately after the 
colonization of Japan, the split of the two Koreas led to polar opposites in terms of economic 
growth and political freedom (Acemoglu et al., 2005). 
An essential question arises. What constitutes good institutions? Acemoglu et al. (2005) define 
good “economic” institutions as “those that provide security of property rights and relatively 
equal access to economic resources to a broad cross-section of society” (p. 395). Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002) assert that good institutions have “a legal system capable of enforcing 
commercial contracts and by transparent and impartial formulation and implementation of 
government economic policy” (p. 342). Good institutions can enable an environment that 
encourages economic activities, incentives, growth, and development (Butkiewicz & 
Yanikkaya, 2006).  Smallholders are often affected by market failures, hence, governments 
respond by implementing policies that supporting small farms (Birner & Resnick, 2010). On 
the other hand, institutions could also contribute to the persistence of smallholder farming by 
hindering farm consolidation with impeding land transfers and withholding opportunities for 
off-farm employment.   
1.2 Defining value chains 
This section defines the concepts of value chains, global value chains, and modern agricultural 
value chains.   I then relate the definitions to the analyses in the three chapters of this dissertation. 
Kaplinsky and Morris' (2001) define value chains as “the full range of activities which are 
required to bring a product or service from conception, through the different phases of 
production, delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use” (Kaplinsky & Morris, 
2001). Value chains are seen as networks that support physical, financial, and informational 
flows (Angelucci & Conforti, 2010). Through these flows, smallholders are better supported 
through market integration and value addition (Angelucci & Conforti, 2010). As agricultural 
production becomes more mechanized and capital intensive, the role of value chains has 
increasingly shifted from primary production to processing and value-adding (Diao et al., 2014; 
El-Enbaby et al., 2016; Breisinger & Diao, 2008).   
The OECD (2020) defines global value chains to “represent all the activities that take place in 
transforming raw materials into the product delivered at its end-use” (p. 7). The framework of 
global value chains takes the traditional value chain concept further by taking in the 




globalization context. In a broader sense, global value chains are connected to a rising level of 
international trade, global GDP, and employment (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016).  The 
framework seeks to “trace the shifting patterns of global production, link geographically 
dispersed activities and actors within a single industry, and determine the roles they play…” 
(Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016, p. 6). In agriculture, the concept revolves around connecting 
local farmers or producers from developing countries to global markets, linking raw-material 
producers to end-users (Dijk & Trienekens, 2012).   
Finally, the concept of modern agricultural value chains is essential to this dissertation.  In line 
with Henderson and Isaac (2017), I argue that the modernization of agricultural value chains in 
developing countries can be attributed to forces on both the demand and supply side.  These 
include forms of foreign direct investments in retail and processing, and requirements in food 
quality and safety standards (Maertens et al., 2012).  One important catalyst for change is 
urbanization and its effects on flows of agricultural production where farmers are becoming 
increasingly dependent on supplying to urban food markets (Minten et al., 2017). Another is 
the increase in trade of high-value commodities. 
1.3 Linking institutions to global and modern agricultural value chains 
According to Kowalski et al. (2015 p. 13), the determinants of countries’ integration into the 
global value chain are “the origin of the value-added embodied in exports both looking 
backward and forward from a reference country: backward when it comes to foreign value-
added embodied in exports and forward when it refers to domestic value added which is used 
as inputs to produce exports in the destination country.” Important mechanisms that stimulate 
participation in the global value chain include market size, level of development, industrial 
structure, location, trade policies, logistics performance, and quality of institutions (Kowalski 
et al., 2015).  Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2016) introduce a model that includes four pillars 
that can better integrate small producers: access to market, access to training, collaboration and 
cooperation building, and access to finance.   
Transaction costs and contract enforcement play an important role when assessing the 
relationship between institutional quality and participation in global value chains. Institutions 
affect integration by facilitating contractual agreements at different stages along a value chain 
(Martincus & Gallo, 2009).  As products become more complex, the need for legal institutions 
also increases due to information asymmetry and the lack of protection and credible 
enforcement (Dollar & Kidder, 2017).  According to Costinot (2009), as a firm expands as a 




result of specialization, more workers are needed, thus results in more contracts that need to be 
enforced. 
More explicitly, governments can impose tariffs or sign trade agreements that could either 
reduce or increase a firm’s competitiveness in the global market (Kowalski et al., 2015).  Cross 
border trade involves transaction costs during the retail and export level, including 
transportation cost, border efficiency, and delivery time (Nordas & Piermartini, 2004). 
Furthermore, infrastructure, the business environment, and other non-tariff measures can affect 
integration into global value chains.  
Institutions play a central role in creating an enabling environment via domestic policies to 
determine a country’s agricultural competitiveness (OECD, 2020). This means that institutional 
quality influences whether countries only export low-value-added products, or whether they 
can integrate into more complex value chains (Dollar & Kidder, 2017), particularly for 
countries with relatively similar levels of skilled labor and overall capital. On the other hand, 
distortions enabled by institutions can impede the creation of value within a global value chain 
(OECD, 2020). 
One of the reasons for the persistence of smallholder farming is influenced by negative and 
positive domestic institutional forces (Ma & Sexton, forthcoming). In many countries around 
the world, institutions impede communal land transfers to assure egalitarian outcomes (Gottlieb 
& Grobovšek, 2019).  Smallholder farming has received much institutional support due to some 
evidence that highlights the importance of smallholder farms if agriculture is to play a role in 
development and poverty reduction (Birner & Resnick, 2010; Diao et al., 2007).  For example, 
governments in many Asian and African countries have committed resources to small farmers, 
such as technical assistance, income transfers, and trade protection (Hazell et al., 2010).   
1.4 Summaries of essays 
The main takeaway from this thesis is that institutions matter through different mechanisms and 
on both a macro and micro-level.  
The first paper, presented in chapter 2, is co-authored with Insa Flachsbarth and Stephan von 
Cramon-Taubadel with the title “The role of institutional quality on the performance in the 
export of coconut products1”. Existing literature on institutional quality and export performance 
only assessed trade in general, or in certain aggregate sectors (Álvarez et al., 2018; Bojnec & 
Ferto, 2015; Meon & Sekkat, 2008). Product-specific studies are lacking. Our study is a first 
attempt to close this literature gap by considering institutional and product heterogeneities. This 
                                                          
1 This paper is published in Agricultural Economics  




chapter aims to answer three research questions.  First, we are interested in how the overall 
institutional environment in exporting countries affects the bilateral trade of coconut products.  
Second, we look into whether improvements in each of the exporters’ indicator scores lead to 
an increase in trade with consideration to the exporters’ and importers’ overall institutional 
setting.  Lastly, we investigate the effects of institutional similarities for coconut trade and its 
different compositions of value addition. To address these questions, we utilize structural 
gravity models to measure how institutional quality affects the trade performance of the top 26 
coconut producing countries to the top 15 importing economies over the span of 20 years. Our 
results suggest that increased government effectiveness enhances trade of high-value products, 
whereas better voice and accountability scores decrease the trade of coconut products in both 
categories of value addition. 
Chapter 3 investigates the challenges and opportunities of a small island nation’s integration 
into the global value chain with an emphasis on the role of institutions titled “Fiji’s participation 
in the global coconut value chain: Opportunities and constraints2”. First, I assess on a macro-
level at the link between institutional quality and Fiji’s export of coconut products. Then, I look 
in-depth by conducting semi-structured interviews with stakeholder groups in different regions 
of Fiji to gain an understanding of the perceived challenges and opportunities in the coconut 
sector. The empirical results show that increased scores in the government's effectiveness and 
voice and accountability indicators enhance coconut exports from Fiji, suggesting that domestic 
institutions play an important role. Interviews with key actors reveal that communications 
among each stakeholder group are fragmented. The main institutional actors and the producers 
have different perceptions of the industry’s challenges, thus resulting in different ideas on how 
to address the issues.     
The fourth chapter of my dissertation is a collaboration stemmed from my research stay at the 
University of California Davis. This study, co-authored with Meilin Ma and Richard Sexton, 
titled “Modern agricultural value chains and food security of urban consumers in developing 
countries”, builds on previous research (Ma & Sexton, forthcoming) that assesses the future of 
smallholder farming systems in modern agricultural value chains.  Their results suggest that 
even considering labor-efficiency advantage, smallholder farms are more likely to encounter 
challenges in selling price and access to market inputs. This study aims to evaluate the effects 
of a transition of rural smallholder farming to selling or tenting landholdings and supplying 
labor to larger commercial farms on the food security and economic welfare in in-country urban 
consumers. We obtain price elasticities of demand for staple food commodities in developing 
                                                          
2 This paper is published in the Journal of Agribusiness in Developing and Emerging Economies 




countries from 15 peer-reviewed articles.  Based on these figures, we embed a demand-side 
framework into the Ma-Sexton model to study the effects of land consolidation and the advent 
of commercial farming systems on the economic welfare of smallholder farmers and home 
country urban consumers. Staple food consumption and smallholder utilities are compared 
under the two scenarios. The simulation results show that compared to smallholder farming, a 
transition to commercial operations leads to larger quantities of staple food produced.  Both 
rural and urban households pay lower prices for staples, enabling them to use the extra net-













































The literature that addresses the role of institutions in bilateral trade is extensive.  However, 
research that links institutional quality to specific products and their different levels of value 
addition is lacking.  In this study, we look into institutional quality, based on three indicators 
from the World Bank, and its indicator-specific effects on bilateral coconut trade.  In particular, 
we study coconut products with varying degrees of value-addition. We utilize structural gravity 
models to measure how institutions affect the trade performance of the top 26 coconut 
producing countries to the top 15 importing economies over the years 1996-2016.  Our results 
suggest that increased government effectiveness enhances trade of high-value products, while 
better voice and accountability scores decrease trade of coconut products with both levels of 
value addition. No clear trade effect is observed when two countries are more similar in each 
of the three indicators.  We conclude that each indicator has different trade effects on each of 
the coconut product categories.  We end by giving recommendations that will help to improve 
the coconut export performance in their respective countries and for future research. 
Keywords: Coconut trade, gravity model, institutional quality, value-added 
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In the last few decades, agricultural value chains have become more and more internationally 
integrated due to advancements in technology, reduction in transportation costs, and market 
liberalization (Degain & Maurer, 2015). These global trends have altered the agricultural 
industry and increased trade in many countries over the past few decades.  This process is 
supported by a wide range of outward-looking policies, such as a reduction in tariffs, market-
determined exchange rate regimes, and more generally, measures to deregulate and facilitate 
international trade. Together, this has generated opportunities for export sectors, especially in 
developing and emerging economies (Gulati et al., 2007). In particular, the production and trade 
of non-traditional and high-value export commodities have increased (Gulati et al., 2007; 
Maertens et al., 2009; O’Connell et al., 2008). Given that poorer countries often depend heavily 
on agriculture, improving market access to such high-value chains can be of great relevance for 
their development paths.       
The trade literature has only recently begun to focus on the role of domestic governance and 
institutional influences in the development of high-value agricultural supply chains. Studies by 
Bojnec and Fertő (2009) and Mendonça et al. (2014) suggest that good governance leads to an 
increase in agricultural trade as a result of lower transaction costs and thus facilitates access to 
high-value agricultural markets. In other words, institutions can foster the transformation of 
countries that traditionally have traded low-value primary products into exporters of high-value 
food products.  
Coconut is an interesting and relevant commodity to study for a number of reasons.  For many 
coconut-producing countries, particularly small Pacific Island countries, the production and 
trade of this commodity support the livelihoods of large parts of the rural population.  
International coconut trade used to be driven by demand for coconut oil (Prades et al., 2016), 
but this has changed in recent decades.  Coconuts are increasingly being transformed into high-
value products that require more complex processing throughout export-oriented value chains. 
This move to high-value-added products is in part driven by marketing strategies that brand 
coconut products as healthy alternatives for hydration and cooking. Since most coconuts are 
grown by poor farmers who have few resources (Naresh et al., 2013), and institutional quality 
tends to be traditionally lower in coconut producing countries than the predominant importing 
economies, it is crucial to look at the role of institutions in the different channels that affect 
coconut trade.    




The growing literature on the role of institutions in international trade has not focused on 
individual high-value commodities and the effects of specific institutional variables.  We fill 
this gap by differentiating between categories of coconut products, characterized by more or 
less value addition, and how they are affected by different dimensions of institutions in a given 
institutional setting.  This allows us to consider product-specific heterogeneities when 
evaluating the effect of each institutional indicator on exports.   
We seek to answer the following research questions: 
R1. How does the overall institutional environment in exporting countries affect bilateral 
trade of coconut products? 
R2. Do improvements in the exporters’ individual indicator scores lead to enhanced trade 
depending on the exporters’ and the importers’ overall institutional setting? 
R3. What are the effects of institutional similarities for coconut trade and its compositions? 
In our empirical analysis, we study the influence of institutions on the export performance of 
coconut products from the top 26 coconut producing countries3 to the top 15 coconut importing 
regions. We measure export performance as the actual volume of exports. We utilize the World 
Bank’s world governance indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999) as measures of 
domestic institutions and apply them in a structural gravity model framework. We first look at 
how the overall institutional structure of a producing country affects coconut trade.  In addition, 
we take three out of the six indicators (voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and 
control of corruption) to assess the influence of each indicator on trade.  We expect that each 
indicator within the institutional structure will affect coconut trade.  For instance, corruption 
could impede trade due to the reduction of domestic investments (Mauro, 1995), while voice 
and accountability could lower trade due to the increased bargaining power of workers (Berden 
et al., 2014).  However, we also expect these effects to vary across high-value and low-value 
coconut products.  
The structure of this paper is as follows.  Section two reviews past literature on the linkages 
between institutions in international trade.  Section three presents the theoretical framework 
that guides our research.  Section four details the data collection method and the estimation 
strategy that we use in this study.  Section five presents our results followed by a discussion 
and policy recommendations.  Finally, section six concludes. 
                                                          
3 These 26 countries make up almost the entire global trade at 95% of the total world trade. 




2.2 Literature review 
This section gives an overview of existing literature on the linkages between institutional 
quality and international trade.  We define institutions after North (1991, p. 97) as “the humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions”.  We are interested 
in what North (1991) calls the “formal rules” of institutions, which are constitutions, laws, and 
property rights. These formal rules affect the transaction costs that arise during the production 
of goods and economic exchanges across international borders. In this study, we associate 
domestic institutions to influence the different processes and actors involved from the 
production to the export of coconut products.  Transaction costs affect this supply chain via the 
transaction effect and the production effect (Belloc, 2006; Berkowitz et al., 2006; Iwanow & 
Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
While definitions such as North’s are widely accepted, measuring institutional quality is a 
difficult undertaking. We utilize the World Bank’s world governance indicators as measures of 
institutions. There are several other indexes of institutional quality.  The Fraser Institute, the 
Heritage Foundation, and World Economic Forum all publish an index to measure countries’ 
degrees of economic freedom.  Transparency International rates countries on their ability to 
control corruption in their corruption perceptions index. Since none of these indexes fully 
captures the different dimensions of what we define as “institutions”, we find the World Bank’s 
indicators as the most suitable for the purposes of this study.   
We follow previous studies by categorizing the six indicators into three dimensions (Berden et 
al., 2014; Lio & Hu, 2009; Lio & Liu, 2008; Méon & Weill, 2005).  Each dimension includes 
two indicators that measure the same aspects of governance.  As outlined in the Methodology 
section below, we use one indicator from each of the three dimensions as our institutional 
variables.   
Table 2.1 summarizes the main findings of selected studies on the subject. These studies 
confirm that governance and institutions contribute to explaining trade flows.  We define good 
institutions after Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) as one with “a legal system capable of 
enforcing commercial contracts and by transparent and impartial formulation and 
implementation of government economic policy” (p. 342). The effect of bad institutions can be 
seen as a tariff which increases the cost of business (Daude & Stein, 2007).  In addition, a bad 
institutional environment raises uncertainty during contract enforcement (de Groot et al., 2004). 




Table 2.1: Summary of findings on institutional quality and international trade4 
References
  
Indicators Utilized Main Findings 
Anderson and Marcouiller 
(1999) 
Contract enforcement Competent institutions can 
increase trade with contract 
enforcement by legal systems. 
 
De Groot et al. (2004) Aggregates of six indicators High institutional quality 
decreases transaction costs 
thus positively influences trade 
flows. 
 
Meon and Sekkat (2008) Aggregates of six indicators Good governance indicators 
increase exports of 
manufactured goods, but not in 
non-manufactured products. 
 
Bojnec and Fertő (2009) Importer-exporter-similarity of 
aggregates of six indicators  
Similarities in institutional 
quality increase agricultural 
trade due to lower transaction 
costs. 
 
Francois and Manchin (2013) Aggregates of six indicators  Domestic institutions can 
boost exports due to increased 
international market access. 
 
Mendonça et al. (2014) Importer-exporter-similarity of 
aggregates of six indicators 
Differences in institutional 
environments between trading 
partners decrease trade flows 





Political stability, rule of law, 
and control of corruption 
Increased scores in political 
stability, rule of law, and 
control of corruption in 
exporting countries increase 
trade. 
 
Anderson and Marcouiller (1999) argue that inadequate contract enforcement can be seen as a 
form of insecurity that introduces hidden transaction costs in international exchange.  With 
good institutions in place, nations have jurisdiction not only to enforce contracts but also to 
implement trade agreements (Rodrik, 2000).  Countries with better institutional quality are able 
to facilitate long-term contracts and agreements at different stages along the value chain which 
allows for increased exports in products with more complex processing (Martincus & Gallo, 
2009).  Amiri et al. (2019) find that in countries with both good institutional quality and rich 
                                                          
4 “Indicators utilized” column specifies the indicators or type of institutions that each authors assessed.  Aggregates 
of six indicators refers to either an average or sum of the six World Bank’s world governance indicators. All studies 
in the table used forms of the gravity model as their methodology. 




natural endowments, rents can lead to a promotion in the manufacturing sector.  De Groot et al. 
(2004) confirm that increased institutional quality is able to decrease ambiguity regarding 
contract enforcement and the governance of overall economics.   
Institutional similarities between two countries can familiarize stakeholders with the procedures 
involved during the process of exchange (de Groot et al., 2004).  Bojnec and Fertő (2009) 
confirm that international trade increases as a result of lower transaction costs when institutions 
are similar.  Two countries might score poorly on political freedom, but this may facilitate trade 
between them since two autocratic regimes might have similar standards and behavior during 
bilateral exchange (Bojnec & Ferto, 2015).  Furthermore, differences in institutional quality 
between two trading countries can reduce trade due to higher transaction costs between the two 
sides (Mendonça et al., 2014).   
Many studies have shown that institutional quality is positively associated with trade on an 
aggregate level (Álvarez et al., 2018; Anderson & Marcouiller, 2002; Francois & Manchin, 
2013). Studies using different institutional indicators show positive influences on the economy.  
Meon and Sekkat (2008) find that governance indicators are positively associated with exports 
of manufactured goods. Yu (2010) finds that democratization can lead to a three to four percent 
growth in bilateral trade.  Abe and Wilson (2008) find that trade in the Asia and Pacific region 
increases with reductions in corruption and increased transparency.  Research by Duc et al. 
(2008) shows that countries with higher levels of corruption trade less with each other. 
Martincus and Gallo (2009) find with increased institutional quality, countries have a 
comparative advantage at trading in sectors that produce more institutional-intensive goods.   
Institutions may not affect export performance equally across sectors.  For example, corruption 
may smooth the export process in sectors such as oil and gas (Meon & Sekkat, 2008).  
Institutions seem to influence manufactured goods and non-manufactured goods differently, as 
Meon and Sekkat (2008) find no significant relationship between non-manufactured products 
and governance indicators.  Martincus and Gallo (2009) find that better institutional quality 
leads to increased export of goods with production processes that are of higher complexity. 
Furthermore, not every aspect of governance is conducive to trade.  For example, Berden et al., 
(2014) find that a rise in pluralism decreases trade flows due to the increasing bargaining power 
of workers.  Aside from the effects of institutions, Yang et al. (2018) note the reliance on social 
networks and informal relationships in supply chain relationships when formal institutions fail 
to facilitate contract enforcement.   




The studies to date have generated many interesting insights, but they have not specifically 
addressed the different dimensions of institutions and their effect on the composition of value-
added trade within a specific agricultural product group.  We intend to fill this gap by analyzing 
the relationship between various aspects of institutional quality and the trade of different 
coconut products with differing levels of value addition.   
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
Theoretical concepts 
Our empirical analyses draw on the World Bank’s world governance indicators. We first assess 
the institutional environment as a whole by averaging the six indicators from the World Bank.  
We then utilize three out of the six indicators to measure their specific influences.  Figure 2.1 
presents the conceptual framework that guides our study.  The framework refers to the coconut 
sector and addresses the actors and steps involved throughout the coconut supply chain.     
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We assess the production and processing aspects of the coconut supply chain through the lens 
of the production effect.  As coconut products go through value addition, the factors and 
processes of production involve more steps and higher production costs, as suggested by 
Berkowitz et al. (2006).  In order to produce an export product, the processing stage needs to 
ensure quality standards, such as product consistency, packaging, and safety.  For example, the 
packaging of coconut water exported to the European Union (EU) must preserve the color and 
taste of the original product. Furthermore, the product must be free from bacteria and other 
contamination (Centre for the Promotion of Imports, 2016).  Countries with lower institution 
quality may not be able to fulfill these requirements and end up exporting only primary and raw 
commodities (Martincus & Gallo, 2009).  These countries could also fail to innovate in the 
production of niche items due to the lack of complementary services and technology to develop 
them (Martincus & Gallo, 2009).  
The production effect influences the production stage of raw coconut materials.  It is estimated 
that around 85% of smallholders across the world still practice traditional nursery methods 
(Johnson & Bourdeix, 2014).  Furthermore, many coconut palms are becoming senile in 
producing countries (FAO, 2013).  Smallholder farmers need institutional support related to 
replanting strategies and access to seedling varieties to ensure the productivity of the palms. 
Institutional quality affects international trade through the “transaction effect”, which involves 
the processes on the retail and export level.  International transaction costs can be referred to as 
any type of cost that is incurred during trade; they include transportation costs, costs to enter 
and enforce contracts, border efficiency, and delivery time (Nordas & Piermartini, 2004).  The 
gap in legal and political systems increases the chance of cheating during bilateral exchange 
(Belloc, 2006).  When insecurities arise during the negotiation and enforcement stages of trade, 
they can act as a price premium on the traded good, resulting in less trade (Anderson & 
Marcouiller, 2002; den Butter & Mosch, 2003).  During the marketing and exporting stage of 
the supply chain, adequate infrastructure is crucial to determine the delivery time of the final 
items.   
The described production and transaction effects of varying degrees of institutional quality are 
embedded into the theoretical assumptions of the gravity model that is chosen for the empirical 
estimation strategy in the study (see Section 4.2).  The gravity model seeks to explain bilateral 
flows by incorporating demand and supply as well as the different relative trade costs.  
Following our line of thought above, institutional quality changes translate into supply changes 
through the production effect and trade cost changes via the transaction effect.  Thus, the gravity 




model fits into our conceptual framework by capturing the aspects of institutional quality along 
different degrees of value addition with their trade effects. 
Hypotheses 
We define each of the institutional indicators in table 2.2, and subsequently, hypothesize their 
anticipated effects on bilateral trade given our conceptual framework. By looking at these 
indicators we answer our research question of the type of institutions that are relevant for 
different types of coconut products.   
Specifically, we test the following hypotheses.  H1 seeks to answer R1; H2 to H4 correspond 
with R2; lastly, R3 is addressed by H5. 
Table 2.2: World Bank’s world governance index and definitions 
Indicator Definition 
Voice and accountability Voice and accountability: the extent to which a country’s citizens 
are able to participate in the selection of their government, as well 
as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media. 
   
Government effectiveness Government effectiveness: the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. 
 
Control of corruption Control of corruption, which is defined as the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain. 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
H1: A good overall institutional environment in producing countries increases bilateral trade 
due to its ability to shape countries’ comparative advantage in goods with different degrees of 
complexity. 
H2: Voice and accountability has a negative effect on bilateral trade flows of high-value 
coconut products as the increase of the bargaining power of workers undermines the level of 
cooperation needed in complex processing and value-added activities. 
The first indicator, “voice and accountability”, assesses a country’s procedure for selecting a 
government and keeping it in check (Berden et al., 2014).  Berden et al. (2014) contend that 
voice and accountability is most related to pluralism.  Pluralism increases the voice and 
bargaining power of unskilled laborers, which could lead to a decrease in foreign investment 
(Berden et al., 2014). Li and Resnick (2003) suggest that pluralism could decrease the degree 
of cooperation in producing countries. We link this indicator to the production and processing 
stage in our conceptual framework. Following these authors, we hypothesize that increased 
voice and accountability negatively affects the international trade of high-value coconut 




products as the increase of bargaining power of workers undermines the level of cooperation 
needed in more complex processing and value-addition within the country. 
H3: Government effectiveness increases bilateral trade flows of both lower- and higher-value 
products due to contract enforcement and monitoring.  
The second indicator “government effectiveness” measures the government’s ability “to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies” (Kaufmann et al., 2009, p. 6).    This 
indicator captures whether institutions are able to deliver complementary services during the 
production of coconuts and the enforcement of contracts during bilateral exchange.  We expect 
increased government effectiveness to have a positive effect on all three stages of the supply 
chain. It facilitates the complementary goods and services needed to process coconut products.  
Furthermore, it can increase exports of all types of coconut products due to increased ability to 
enforce and monitor the stages of processing.  We hypothesize that this indicator will have a 
bigger effect on high-value products since it is more challenging to enforce contracts during the 
trade of more complex products (Berkowitz et al., 2006).   
H4: Control of corruption increases bilateral trade flows of both product categories as it 
facilitates economic interactions and increases trust between exporting and importing 
countries. 
The indicator “control of corruption” measures the extent to which the government respects its 
citizens and the rules of society (Kaufmann et al., 2009).  Better control of corruption means 
that courts within a country are able to exercise impartiality and handle cases without any biased 
influence in the court’s final decision (Berkowitz et al., 2006).  High levels of corruption hinder 
international trade by lowering productivity and especially the quality of customs services (Ben 
Ali & Mdhillat, 2015).  We expect that entry points for corruption occur through the more 
complex stages of processing coconuts.  Furthermore, if a country is known to be corrupt, then 
importing countries are less certain that products will fulfill the indicated quality and standards.  
We anticipate that easing corruption leads to better performance in all coconut exports, with the 
effect to be larger for high-value than for low-value products. 
H5: Similarities in all three above indicators lead to increased trade between two countries due 
to familiar procedures in bureaucratic procedures involved during both the production and 
transaction process.5 
Lastly, we expect institutional similarities in all three indicators to be positively associated with 
bilateral trade.  Institutional similarity reduces the adjustment costs that arise from dissimilar 
                                                          
5 H5 intends to address whether institutional similarities positively or negatively affect bilateral trade, but not in 
the magnitude of trade. 




procedures and insecurities during bilateral trade (Linders et al., 2005).  In addition, the nature 
of doing business in two countries could refer to ethical standards; if bribing officials is 
considered acceptable in two countries, then bribes might facilitate trade between both 
(Horsewood & Voicu, 2012). 
2.4 Data and methodology 
Data 
To estimate the determinants of bilateral trade flows in coconut products, we gathered trade 
data and proxies for trade costs from various sources for the years 1996-2016.  Reasons for 
using the specific data in our framework are explained in detail in section 4.2. We obtain 
bilateral coconut trade data from the United Nations Commodity Trade (UNComtrade) database, 
via the World Integrated Trading System (WITS).  We use data on import values by the 15 
largest importers of coconut products from the top 26 coconut producing countries measured in 
US Dollars.  Import data is considered more reliable since governments have higher incentives 
to track imports for tax purposes (Francois & Manchin, 2013).  Table 2.3 shows a list of the top 
coconut producing countries in 2016, expressed in metric tons, and their trade value in 1000 
US Dollars. 
Table 2.3: Main coconut producing countries in 2016 with production quantity in tons and trade 
value in 1000 US dollars 
Country Production (MT) 
Export 
(in 1000$) 
Indonesia 17,722,429 1,287,991.00 
Philippines 13,825,080 1,861,631.00 
India 11,127,898 281,608.20 
Brazil 2,649,246 72,579.08 
Sri Lanka 2,520,095 353,524.00 
Vietnam 1,469,960 318,745.30 
Papua New Guinea 1,191,438 88,386.06 
Mexico 1,157,481 191,344.50 
Thailand 815,406 1,069,091.00 
Tanzania 555,836 2,359.12 
Myanmar 531,730 27,855.91 
Malaysia 504,773 473,522.60 
Kiribati 437,000 2,106.76 
Ghana 380,380 8,751.75 
Dominican Republic 374,474 19,920.63 
Solomon Islands 341,876 16,908.75 
Vanuatu 336,988 15,183.71 
China 316,579 732,289.60 
Nigeria 283,744 2,068.85 
Jamaica 255,411 8,454.77 




Mozambique 248,394 6,816.43 
Fiji 206,393 5,584.58 
Samoa 179,602 555.34 
Venezuela 157,391 1,172.44 
Cote d'Ivoire 142,923 27,886.03 
Marshall Islands 253,06 1,719.99 
Source: FAOSTAT 
We consider three categories of coconut products as shown in table 2.4.  The first category 
includes high-value coconut products, which we assume are required to meet higher quality 
expectations of importing countries.  These products are likely to be edible items that must 
fulfill exacting quality and traceability standards. The “low-value” products in the second 
category do not need to meet such exacting criteria. Finally, coconut oil is in its own category 
due to its dominance in coconut exports.  In the year 2017/2018, the global export volume was 
around 1.7 million metric tons (USDA, 2018). 
Table 2.4: Coconut product categories6 
Categories Products included 
High-value products  Fresh and/or dried coconuts, coconut milk, activated carbon and 
coconut water 
Low-value products  Copra, coir, and oilcake 
Coconut Oil  All types of oil 
 
Traded items are only published on the UN Comtrade database up to six-digit Harmonized 
System (HS) codes.  Coconut milk, coconut water, and activated carbon from coconuts are all 
traded in eight-digit HS codes which are not documented in the database.  For this reason, we 
take up six-digit codes reported by UN Comtrade. 
As outlined above, we use the World Bank’s world governance indicators from the years 1996 
to 2016 to measure institutional quality.  The World Bank published the indicators bi-yearly 
from 1996 to 2002, and annually since then.  For the years 1997, 1999, and 2001, we use the 
values from the previous year.  The World Bank’s world governance index is one of the most 
recognized and referenced indicators in research.  It is based on hundreds of variables created 
by 33 international organizations (Kaufmann et al., 2009).  The six indicators are scaled from -
2.5 to 2.5.  Higher values correspond to better governance, and zero is the median score. We 
then select one indicator from each of the three dimensions mentioned in our conceptual 
framework: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and control of corruption and 
measured its effects separately in both exporting and importing countries according to their 
                                                          
6 See table A2.4 for detailed product HS codes and their average unit values 




institutional setting. Table 2.5 shows exporters and importers with either positive or negative 
average indicator scores.   
Since the indicators are themselves correlated, each indicator could affect trade directly or 
indirectly by its influence on the other indicators (Lio & Liu, 2008).  For this reason, we choose 
one from each dimension to avoid the possible correlation between the two indicators.  Despite 
their great advantage of comparability at the global scale, these indicators do have certain 
weaknesses.  Thomas (2010) asserts that the concepts of each indicator are not clearly defined.  
Furthermore, the definitions are not based on any theory, nor are they consistent with the 
existing literature (Thomas, 2010).  Langbein and Knack (2010) contend that it is difficult to 
distinguish one indicator from another since each is represented by different concepts.  
Nevertheless, the index includes a wide sample of countries including almost all countries of 
interest in this study.   
Table 2.5: Exporters and importers by positive and negative average indicator categories 
Country Groups Positive average 
indicators 
Negative average indicators 
Exporters Brazil, Kiribati, Jamaica, 
Kiribati, Malaysia, Vanuatu 
China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican 
Republic, Fiji, Ghana, India, Indonesia, 
Marshall Islands, Mexico, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, 
the Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Venezuela, Vietnam 
 
Importers Australia, Canada, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, 
United States, EU 27 
China, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, 
Russia, Thailand 
 
Despite their shortcomings, these indicators are considered to be one of the best existing 
measurements to assess institutional quality (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007).  Table 2.6 gives an 
overview of the three indicators in percentile rank for some selected coconut exporting and 
importing regions in our study in 1996, 2016, and their overall average scores over 20 years.  
We can observe that some exporting countries, such as China, rank high on good government 
effectiveness and low on voice and accountability.  By contrast, Brazil has improved its ranking 
in voice and accountability but fallen in government effectiveness and control of corruption.  
There are different methods to represent these six indicators. Certain bodies of literature on 
bilateral trade have used the six variables as separate measures (Álvarez et al., 2018; Lio & Hu, 




2009; Martínez-Zarzoso & Márquez-Ramos, 2018; Méon & Weill, 2005). Other studies have 
constructed dummy variables based on whether the institutional measure is positive or negative 
(i.e. above or below the median for all countries), or by summing or averaging the scores of all 
six indicators into one overall measure (de Groot et al., 2005; Linders et al., 2005; de Groot et 
al., 2004).  In order to analyze the effects of each indicator, we treat each indicator as a separate 
variable.  For instance, if we take further scrutiny into China’s scores on each of the three 
indicators as shown in table 6, we can see that its percentile rank in voice and accountability 
rating is ranked seventh in the year 2016, where government effectiveness ranked 68.  
Table 2.6: Percentile Rank of Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, and Control 
of Corruption for selected exporting countries 
Country VA GE CC  Year 
 Percentile Rank (1-100)  
Brazil 58 51 57 1996 
 62 48 38 2016 
China 12 43 48 1996 
 7 68 49 2016 
Indonesia 21 23 22 1996 
 50 53 43 2016 
Jamaica 66 60 62 1996 
 70 69 52 2016 
Mozambique 41 50 41 1996 
 34 19 18 2016 
Sri Lanka 41 49 54 1996 
 43 45 48 2016 
Solomon Isl. 72 N/A 65 1996 
 63 15 44 2016 
Note: Countries are listed in alphabetic order 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
To better interpret the results of our main variables of interest, we have rescaled the three 
indicators of the exporting countries to 1-100.  To put things into perspective, for example, if 
Indonesia were to improve their score of government effectiveness from 65 points in 2016 by 
ten points, this increase would take them to the same level of effectiveness as China in 2016.  
We constructed our institutional similarities variables by using the absolute values of the 
difference of each indicator as follows: |𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑖 − 𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑗| (Bojnec & Ferto, 2015), where WGI 
refers to each of the three institutional variables, i is the exporting country, and j is the importing 
country. We obtain coconut production data from FAOSTAT.  The remaining gravity model 
variables, which include the distance between the importing and exporting countries, gross 
domestic products (GDPs), indicators for common language, common religion, contiguity, and 
regional agreement come from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII).   The EU is treated as one importing entity in this study since a large 




portion of coconuts and coconut products are exported to the Netherlands, and then re-exported 
to other countries within the EU 27. Hence, the Netherlands is considered the destination for 
measuring bilateral distances.  An exporting country is said to share a common official language 
with the EU 27 if it shares one of its official languages with at least one country in the EU 27.  
Table 2.7 shows the summary statistics of our main variables of interest.  
Table 2.7: Summary Statistics 
 Mean S.d. Min. Max. 
Trade (1000$) 734.49 8901.70 0 611,810.6 
Distance (km) 8,641.16 4,762.39 505.54 19,146.71 
GDP (US$ millions) 1,900,000 3,600,000 1,290 18,624,475 
Production (MT) 2,112,673 4,352,028 4,080 196,000 
Contiguity .04 .21 0 1 
Common off. lang. .27 .44 0 1 
Common religion .08 .13 0 .81 
RTA .14 .35 0 1 
Voice & accountability i -.13 .76 -2.23 1.26 
Government Effectiveness i  -.36 .56 -2.27 1.27 
Control of Corruption i -.43 .46 -1.67 .66 
Voice & accountability j .19 .98 -1.78 1.67 
Government Effectiveness j .81 .93 -1.21 2.44 
Control of Corruption j .57 1.14 -1.31 2.33 
Voice & accountability ij 1.06 0.74 .0000562 3.79 
Government Effectiveness ij 1.34 0.87 .0002905 4.26 
Control of Corruption ij 1.30 0.92 .0007986 3.97 
Observations 88935    
     
Empirical specification 
We use extended versions of the gravity model (Tinbergen, 1962) for our estimations.  The 
gravity model has been used extensively in the literature to examine the different factors that 
influence bilateral trade.  It has become increasingly popular throughout the last decade for 
research on trade due to its intuition, theoretical foundations, realistic equilibrium environment, 
flexible structure, and strong predictions (Yotov et al., 2016).  Many recent studies that analyze 
trade and institutional quality, trade facilitation, and trade costs have utilized variations and 
extensions of the gravity model.    
The model in its basic form takes into consideration the geographical distance between the 
exporting and importing countries, and the GDPs of both countries to represent the trade costs 
between the two (Shepherd, 2013).  The intuition behind the theory is that countries with larger 
GDPs or countries that are closer to each other have a bigger gravity force that pulls them 
together (Feenstra & Taylor, 2014), leading to larger volumes of trade.  Our approach takes 
after Álvarez et al. (2018) with the foundations on the new trade theory, characterized by the 




Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman assumptions by taking into account the “love for variety” preferences, 
increasing returns to scale technologies, and iceberg transportation costs.      
In a survey of gravity models, Kabir et al. (2017) discussed the importance of modeling 
differentiated products.  We address this by estimating the gravity model in its structural form 
at different levels of product aggregation: the trade effect of institutions is estimated (1) at the 
product-level, (2) at the aggregate coconut sector-level, and (3) at the aggregate agricultural-
sector level. We compare the coconut product level with the aggregate coconut level is to see 
whether institutional quality affects aggregate trade in coconut products differently than it 
affects individual sub-categories of coconut products with different levels of value addition. 
Given that institutional quality indicators are not specifically designed for the coconut industry, 
other agricultural sectors might even benefit more than the coconut industry if institutions 
improve. This may even induce a shift away from coconut production and trade due to relative 
price changes in favor of other sectors. To consider these relative advantages in our analysis, 
we estimate the effect of the three institutional quality indicators on the remaining agricultural 
sector (defined as total agricultural exports minus exports of coconut products).   
Before we derive the concrete equations for each aggregation level, we explain some gravity-
specific estimation issues that need to be accounted for in order to obtain valid results.  We use 
panel data for the estimates of our gravity model to capture the institutional changes that occur 
in coconut producing countries from 1996 to 2016.  The data generating process of the gravity 
equation has a micro-theoretical foundation.  Thus, we take into account multilateral trade 
resistance (MTR), which refers to the fact that bilateral trade flows do not only depend on trade 
barriers between the respective exporting and importing country but also on barriers that the 
exporting and importing country encounters with all of their trading partners (Adam & Cobham, 
2007).   
In our structural gravity models, we address MTR with the Bonus-Vetus method, proposed by 
Baier and Bergstrand (2009). This approach addresses MTR by applying a first-order log-linear 
Taylor series approximation to the non-linear MTR terms to account for exogenous variables 
that influence trade costs (Shepherd, 2013).   
Each trade cost variable is transformed as follows, which we illustrate for the example of the 
variable ‘distance’: 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗 =  𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁














            (1) 
, where i = exporting country, j = importing country, k=coconut-product and t = year.  




This method is preferred for this study since the three main institutional variables of interest are 
country-time-specific or country-pair specific (in the case of institutional similarities), 
respectively. Therefore, country-time and country-pair fixed effects are collinear with the 
institutional variables of interest which would lead to their exclusion from the model (Shepherd, 
2013). The alternative approach of using the multiplicative form of exporter-time (-product) 
and importer-time (-product) fixed effects is also not viable due to the occurrence of many 
singletons during estimation. Hence, we follow Berger et al., (2013) and include importer and 
time fixed effects to limit omitted variable biases which might result from import regimes and 
the increasing role of non-tariff barriers that are specific to the importing country and traded 
product. Product fixed effects are also applied, but only in the aggregate coconut and 
agricultural sector estimations. 
Since many coconut producing countries are small economies and have limited trading partners, 
zero trade values are frequent in our datasets, especially for the rarer coconut products. 
Traditional gravity estimations convert the dependent variables as logarithms, which omits zero 
trade data to include only positive trade flows (Martin & Pham, 2015).  In our sample, we have 
a total of seven coconut traded products, resulting in large portions of zeroes. This poses a 
problem when measuring bilateral trade as it could lead to selection bias.  Different methods 
have been proposed to deal with zero trade. We adopt the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
(PPML) estimation method proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).  It includes zero 
trade flows without any data transformation and provides unbiased estimates in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. 
We take our transformed right-hand-side variables from equation (1) and estimate their trade 
effects with the PPML method, first, with aggregated indicator scores. This gives us the 
following gravity equation per coconut product category: 
 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘 = exp[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡+𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡+𝛽9𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡] ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(2) 
, where k= product which means that we estimate each trade effect separately for each of the 
mentioned coconut products. 
We then estimated the three indicators based on whether the exporting and importing countries 
score positive or negative on average: 
 





𝑘 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡+𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡+𝛽17𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽18𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝜇𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡] ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(3) 
For the aggregate coconut sector, we estimate the following gravity equation:  
𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡+𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡+𝛽17𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽18𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝜇𝑗 + 𝑣𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡] ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡 
            (4) 
, where k = coconut product, but all products are estimated within one equation, thus we only 
obtain one coefficient estimate for the entire industry and control for product fixed effects. 
For the remaining agricultural sector, we estimate the following gravity equation: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡+𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡+𝛽17𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽18𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝜇𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡] 
(5) 
Here, no product dimensions are included. 
Table 2.8 describes each of the variables and their definition as specified in our models.  
Table2. 8: List of variables in the gravity model and their definitions 
Variables Definitions 
𝑿𝒊,𝒋,𝒕
𝒌  Bilateral trade of product k between countries i and j 
𝜷𝟎 Unknown intercept 
𝒍𝒏𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒋 Log of distance between the capital city of countries i and j 
𝒍𝒏𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕 Log of coconut production in metric tons of country i 
𝒍𝒏𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒋𝒕 Log of GDP of country j 
𝑳𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊𝒋 Dummy variable to indicate whether countries i and j share a common 
official language 
𝑹𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒋𝒕 Dummy variable to indicate whether countries i and j is part of a regional 
trade agreement  
𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒋 Dummy variable to indicate whether country i and j share a common religion 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒋 Whether countries i and j share a border 
𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝒊 Average of the WB’s six world governance indicators 
𝑽𝑨𝒊 Voice and accountability indicator in country i 
𝑮𝑬𝒊 Government effectiveness indicator in country i 
𝑪𝑪𝒊 Control of corruption indicator in country i 
𝑽𝑨𝒊𝒋 Voice and accountability similarity between countries i and j 
𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒋 Government effectiveness similarity between countries i and j 
𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒋 Control of corruption similarity between countries i and j 




𝝁𝒋 Importer fixed effects  
𝒗𝒌 Product fixed effects  
𝜹𝒕 Time fixed effects 
∈𝒊𝒋𝒕 Error term, unobserved factors that change over time 
 
2.5 Results 
Table 2.9 presents the results of our PPML Bonus-Vetus estimations with aggregate indicators.  
Columns (1) – (7) specify the results of each of the coconut product categories.  These are then 
compared to results to all the aggregate coconut products in column (8).  Column (9) shows 
results from all other agricultural products (excluding coconut products) in the same 26 coconut 
exporting countries.  Figures in brackets below the coefficients represent standard errors. 
When considering aggregate measures of the six indicators, bilateral trade increases only for 
oilcake, where a one-point increase in the average institutional indicators leads to an 8.7% but 
decreases in fresh or dried coconuts by nearly seven percent. Trade in all other agricultural 
sectors rises by almost five percent.  Similarities in voice and accountability increase trade of 
copra, but decreases exports of milk/water, activated carbon, and in the remaining agricultural 
sector. The opposite result hold for similarities in government effectiveness as trade increases 
in all three categories of high-value-added products and the rest of agricultural products.  The 
result is less clear cut when two countries share similar levels of control of corruption.  It 
appears to increase trade of coir but decreases trade of oilcake and the rest of the agricultural 
sector.  
Table 2.10 shows results with the three separate indicators from exporters with positive average 
indicators.  These results are compared to table 2.11 with exporters with average institutional 
scores that are less than zero to disentangle the effects of each indicator in different institutional 
settings. From here on, the two categories are referred to as positive exporters and negative 
exporters. The indicator, voice and accountability, shows similar trade effects across almost all 
categories of coconut products in both positive and negative exporters but differs in effect sizes.  
In positive exporting countries, a one-point increase in voice and accountability decrease trade 
in all products except for copra and activated carbon with the largest effect size in oilcake at 
43.5% and 14.5% in coconut oil.  In negative exporting countries, the results show no effect on 
coconut oil and copra but decrease all other coconut categories from five to around ten percent.   
We observe a difference between the effect of government effectiveness on low-value and high-
value products in both categories of exporters.  Trade is decreased in copra and oilcake but 
increases in all categories that we consider as high-value plus coconut oil.  Yet, in negative 




Table 2.9: Institutional quality and exports with average institutional indicator scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 










lnDistance -0.426 0.663 1.090*** -2.266*** -0.738** -1.057*** 0.071 -0.170 -0.599*** 
 (0.704) (0.425) (0.365) (0.619) (0.289) (0.255) (0.376) (0.363) (0.140) 
lnGDP 6.330*** 2.095*** 0.230 1.268*** 1.358*** 0.395* 1.374*** 0.569*** 0.784*** 
 (1.110) (0.622) (0.159) (0.408) (0.319) (0.211) (0.271) (0.176) (0.104) 
lnProduction 0.573*** 0.626*** 1.270*** 2.270*** 0.339*** 0.740*** 0.802*** 0.785*** 0.627*** 
 (0.120) (0.114) (0.127) (0.367) (0.099) (0.123) (0.111) (0.082) (0.042) 
Contiguity 1.398 2.084* 0.560 -1.307 1.707*** -1.309 0.820 1.067 0.498 
 (1.013) (1.169) (0.770) (1.091) (0.529) (0.993) (0.765) (0.755) (0.339) 
Language 0.624 -0.570 -0.083 -1.003 0.739** -0.274 -0.530 0.425 0.515** 
 (0.697) (1.027) (0.642) (0.905) (0.350) (0.664) (0.731) (0.406) (0.234) 
RTA 0.394 2.307** 0.280 0.630 -0.647 -0.587 0.156 -0.320 0.334 
 (0.985) (1.057) (0.319) (0.522) (0.394) (0.371) (0.438) (0.494) (0.221) 
Religion 0.371 -9.023*** 5.511*** 4.207 -0.470 0.873 4.219** 3.450*** -0.781 
 (1.287) (3.088) (2.129) (3.562) (1.640) (2.321) (1.870) (1.181) (1.203) 
Average indicatori -0.038 -0.033 0.033 0.087* 0.004 -0.021 -0.069*** -0.009 0.049*** 
 (0.030) (0.046) (0.026) (0.046) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.018) (0.008) 
Voice & accountabilityij -2.180*** -0.365 0.219 1.101 1.620*** 1.874*** -0.173 1.122*** 0.462*** 
 (0.608) (0.468) (0.239) (0.674) (0.297) (0.300) (0.445) (0.303) (0.120) 
Government effectivenessij 1.400** 0.932 -0.319 1.383 -1.708*** -1.729*** -1.443*** -1.465*** -0.447* 
 (0.613) (0.578) (0.638) (0.954) (0.471) (0.417) (0.405) (0.329) (0.238) 
Control of corruptionij 0.751 -2.999*** 0.784 2.003** 0.354 -0.475 -0.516 0.244 0.557** 
 (0.821) (1.149) (0.589) (1.005) (0.320) (0.417) (0.686) (0.330) (0.276) 
Importer FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Product FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Observations 8,085 12,206 16,170 8,085 16,170 8,085 16,170 88,935 7,469 
R-squared 0.275 0.413 0.559 0.798 0.318 0.673 0.347 0.399 0.761 
Clustered standard errors by country pair in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent variables are trade values in 1000 USD; Voice & accountabilityij, government 
effectivenessij, and control of corruptionij mean dissimilarity of institutional quality, thus a negative sign should be interpreted as a trade increasing effect if two countries are more 
similar; coefficients are interpreted as elasticities; production refers to coconut production in the coconut sectors, and total agricultural production (minus coconut production) in 
the remaining agricultural sector. 
 
 




Table 2.10: Institutional quality and exports: exporters with positive aggregate indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent Variables Copra Coir Coconut Oil Oilcake Milk/Water Activated Carbon Fresh or Dried Aggregate Remaining agricultural sector 
(excl. coconuts) 
lnDIST 0.962 -0.348 1.187** -1.596* -1.323*** -0.047 -0.552* 0.014 -0.592*** 
 (0.694) (0.351) (0.477) (0.817) (0.330) (0.384) (0.312) (0.288) (0.087) 
lnGDP 8.708*** 0.942 1.105*** 2.646 1.415** 1.415*** 1.305*** 1.201*** 1.541*** 
 (2.058) (0.582) (0.318) (1.889) (0.577) (0.296) (0.444) (0.244) (0.118) 
lnProduction 0.291 1.424*** 1.239*** 1.419*** 0.674*** 1.507*** 0.677*** 0.863*** 0.743*** 
 (0.300) (0.244) (0.178) (0.314) (0.151) (0.185) (0.122) (0.097) (0.029) 
Contig 3.661 1.824*** 4.066*** -1.163 0.316 0.017 0.410 1.643 0.897*** 
 (2.230) (0.627) (1.017) (6.174) (0.441) (0.791) (0.417) (1.065) (0.145) 
LANG -0.630 -0.104 -0.252 -2.215 1.052*** 0.477 0.016 0.228 0.640*** 
 (1.215) (0.796) (0.837) (1.350) (0.391) (0.839) (0.676) (0.572) (0.089) 
RTA 2.327 1.916** -0.380 -4.122 -0.684* 0.194 0.440 -0.130 -0.446*** 
 (1.545) (0.848) (0.714) (3.444) (0.349) (0.311) (0.456) (0.387) (0.142) 
Religion -1.430 -9.556*** 4.514** 5.235 -3.229 -0.615 2.082 2.165 -0.688* 
 (3.433) (2.650) (2.162) (5.085) (2.304) (2.803) (2.489) (1.334) (0.415) 
Voice & accountabilityi -0.000 -0.089*** -0.145*** -0.435*** -0.058*** -0.015 -0.044*** -0.102*** 0.005 
 (0.032) (0.021) (0.026) (0.148) (0.021) (0.024) (0.007) (0.013) (0.004) 
Government effectivenessi -0.084*** -0.036 0.029* -0.216*** 0.065*** 0.188*** 0.048** 0.030 0.029*** 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.017) (0.055) (0.014) (0.034) (0.021) (0.019) (0.005) 
Control of corruptioni 0.065*** 0.096*** -0.032 0.081** 0.014 -0.017 -0.048*** -0.063*** 0.011** 
 (0.024) (0.037) (0.023) (0.040) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.006) 
Voice & accountabilityij 0.541 -0.684** -0.302 -7.734* 0.569 0.870** -0.269 -0.117 0.185** 
 (0.942) (0.346) (0.470) (3.985) (0.576) (0.357) (0.276) (0.409) (0.087) 
Government effectivenessij -0.122 1.230 0.632** -2.721** 0.281 1.473*** 0.145 0.019 -0.278*** 
 (0.733) (0.879) (0.319) (1.281) (0.287) (0.283) (0.437) (0.287) (0.077) 
Control of corruptionij 2.258*** -1.311 -0.333 3.451** 0.291 0.192 -1.967*** -0.076 0.683*** 
 (0.752) (0.896) (0.457) (1.704) (0.273) (0.293) (0.463) (0.365) (0.166) 
Importer FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Product FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Observations 1,298 7,186 3,742 1,350 10,092 1,871 10,092 22,077 2,592 
R-squared 0.352 0.630 0.577 0.894 0.532 0.877 0.355 0.360 0.931 
Clustered standard errors by country pair in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent variables are trade values in 1000 USD; Voice & accountabilityij, government effectivenessij, and 
control of corruptionij mean dissimilarity of institutional quality, thus a negative sign should be interpreted as a trade increasing effect if two countries are more similar; coefficients are interpreted as 
elasticities; production refers to coconut production in the coconut sectors, and total agricultural production (minus coconut production) in the remaining agricultural sector.




Table 2.11: Institutional quality and exports: exporters with negative aggregate indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent Variables Copra Coir Coconut Oil Oilcake Milk/Water Activated Carbon Fresh or Dried Aggregate 
Remaining agricultural sector 
(excl. coconuts) 
lnDIST -0.568 -0.074 0.650 -2.797*** -0.852*** -1.144*** -0.443 -0.466 -0.630*** 
 (0.764) (0.349) (0.479) (0.631) (0.317) (0.231) (0.307) (0.322) (0.042) 
lnGDP 6.257*** 2.107*** 0.303 1.740*** 1.792*** 1.206*** 1.143*** 0.669*** 0.711*** 
 (1.054) (0.659) (0.213) (0.377) (0.372) (0.211) (0.310) (0.171) (0.065) 
lnProduction 0.675*** 1.552*** 1.793*** 2.552*** 0.468*** 0.976*** 1.141*** 1.039*** 0.524*** 
 (0.150) (0.221) (0.248) (0.405) (0.144) (0.104) (0.145) (0.117) (0.027) 
Contig 1.128 1.043* 0.092 -0.623 1.185** -1.411* 0.299 0.647 0.456*** 
 (0.940) (0.630) (0.634) (1.114) (0.505) (0.834) (0.463) (0.645) (0.104) 
LANG 0.703 -0.717 0.011 -0.636 0.711** -0.160 -0.398 0.243 0.365*** 
 (0.767) (0.741) (0.748) (0.972) (0.361) (0.632) (0.769) (0.458) (0.096) 
RTA 0.439 2.742*** 0.564** 0.650 -0.463 -0.548* 0.048 -0.285 0.324*** 
 (0.828) (0.796) (0.229) (0.626) (0.371) (0.311) (0.430) (0.419) (0.078) 
Religion 0.574 -7.392*** 6.585*** 5.510 -1.545 -0.206 4.775*** 3.960*** -0.875** 
 (1.471) (2.349) (2.095) (3.446) (1.834) (2.317) (1.830) (1.188) (0.341) 
Voice & accountabilityi -0.015 -0.099*** -0.018 -0.048** -0.062*** -0.074*** -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.002 
 (0.033) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) 
Government effectivenessi -0.050 -0.043 -0.005 0.091** 0.072*** 0.084*** 0.040** 0.079*** 0.011 
 (0.036) (0.032) (0.022) (0.041) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.008) 
Control of corruptioni -0.056 0.139*** -0.036** -0.029 -0.016 0.053*** -0.011 -0.017 0.034*** 
 (0.051) (0.029) (0.017) (0.024) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.007) 
Voice & accountabilityij -2.771*** -0.890*** 0.083 -0.471 0.080 0.225 -0.437* 0.270 0.247*** 
 (1.008) (0.288) (0.235) (0.300) (0.208) (0.266) (0.257) (0.254) (0.079) 
Government effectivenessij 0.279 1.031 0.353 3.592*** -0.155 -0.047 0.227 0.391 -0.658*** 
 (0.769) (0.748) (0.408) (1.321) (0.502) (0.430) (0.359) (0.338) (0.140) 
Control of corruptionij 0.061 -0.536 -1.172*** -0.227 -0.313 0.356 -0.781** -0.829*** 0.923*** 
 (1.965) (0.634) (0.413) (1.180) (0.373) (0.336) (0.395) (0.314) (0.218) 
Importer FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Product FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Observations 6,078 10,681 12,156 6,078 14,163 6,078 14,163 66,858 4,875 
R-squared 0.439 0.600 0.582 0.832 0.308 0.712 0.376 0.427 0.726 
Clustered standard errors by country pair in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent variables are trade values in 1000 USD; Voice & accountabilityij, government effectivenessij, and 
control of corruptionij mean dissimilarity of institutional quality, thus a negative sign should be interpreted as a trade increasing effect if two countries are more similar; coefficients are interpreted as 
elasticities; production refers to coconut production in the coconut sectors, and total agricultural production (minus coconut production) in the remaining agricultural sector




increases in the high-value categories and on an aggregate level.  An increase in control of 
corruption shows contrasting results by product and exporter category.  Trade of lower-value 
coconut products is increased whereas trade of fresh or dried coconuts and on an aggregate 
level is decreased in positive exporting countries.  In negative exporting countries, results don’t 
vary by product categories.  Export of coir and activated carbon is increased, while that of 
coconut oil is decreased.  Trade is increased in the remaining agricultural sector in both exporter 
categories.   
For positive exporters, similarities in voice and accountability increase exports of coir and 
oilcake while decreasing trade flows of activated carbon.  In negative exporting countries, trade 
is increased in copra, coir, and fresh or dried.   Two countries that are more similar in 
government effectiveness trade more only in oilcake and export less of coconut oil and activated 
carbon in positive exporting countries.  Exports in all other agricultural products are increased 
in both exporter categories.   Lastly, similarities in the control of corruption reduce trade in the 
low-value products of copra and oilcake and increase exports of fresh or dried coconuts in 
positive exporting countries.  It also increases bilateral trade in the remaining agricultural 
products.  Two countries similar in levels of control of corruption in negative exporting 
countries increase trade of coconut oil and fresh or dried categories, but trade decreases in the 
remaining agricultural sector. 
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 show results from importers with positive aggregate indicators and those 
with negative indicators, respectively.  We refer to them as positive and negative importers 
hereafter. The results closely resemble each other in the voice and accountability indicator.  
Exports decrease by around five percent across coconut products while no effect is observed in 
the remaining agricultural products in positive importing countries.  For negative importers, 
trade is decreased with more variations in effect size in all coconut products except for copra 
and oilcake.  Government effectiveness increases trade for positive importers in all categories 
of coconut products where a one-point increase leads to a seven to eight percent increase in 
exports.  In contrast, the same indicator for negative importers, trade is either decreased or has 
no effect on low-value products and increases exports in high-value products.  No effect is 
observed in the trade of remaining agricultural products.  Control of corruption appears to have 
no influence on the export of coconut products in positive importing countries. A one-point 
increase in this indicator increases trade by 4.4% in all other agricultural products.  Results are 
more varied with negative importers, where exports of coir and oilcake are increased while 
fresh or dried coconuts are reduced. 
 




Results differ more between the two categories of importers when assessing institutional 
similarities.  They do not appear to matter much with positive importers.  There is no effect in 
any of the product categories when two countries are more similar in voice and accountability.   
Trade is decreased when two countries share similarities in government effectiveness in the 
products of oil, oilcake, milk/water, plus on an aggregate coconut product level, however with 
a p-value of 0.1.  Similarities in control of corruption increase trade in coconut oil and in all 
remaining agricultural sector.   
In the negative importer category, similarities in voice and accountability stimulate trade of 
copra, coir, and oilcake, but exports of activated carbon decrease. Two countries more alike in 
government effectiveness reduce bilateral trade for coconut oil, milk/water, and on an aggregate 
level.  Exports are increased for activated carbon and in the remaining agricultural sector. The 
effect size is also larger in the negative importer’s category.   Similarities in control of 
corruption have a positive effect on the trade of coconut oil and in the rest of the agricultural 
sector in positive importing countries.  In negative importing countries, trade of copra and 
oilcake is decreased and export of milk/water and fresh or dried coconuts are increased.   
.




Table 2.12: Institutional quality and coconut exports: importers with positive aggregate indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variables Copra Coir Coconut Oil Oilcake Milk/Water Activated Carbon Fresh or Dried Aggregate Remaining agricultural sector 
(excl. coconuts) 
lnDIST -0.247 -0.219 -0.380 -0.231 -0.283 -0.240 -0.267 -0.216 -0.699** 
 (0.354) (0.345) (0.324) (0.346) (0.338) (0.343) (0.343) (0.347) (0.350) 
lnGDP 0.958*** 0.809*** 0.479** 0.889*** 1.061*** 0.925*** 0.940*** 0.913*** 0.820*** 
 (0.246) (0.256) (0.195) (0.244) (0.266) (0.229) (0.218) (0.254) (0.107) 
lnProduction 0.928*** 0.928*** 1.033*** 0.935*** 0.947*** 0.938*** 0.962*** 0.927*** 0.870*** 
 (0.091) (0.095) (0.108) (0.096) (0.091) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.099) 
Contig 2.031*** 1.984*** 0.988 1.932*** 1.671*** 1.861*** 1.664*** 2.012*** -0.419 
 (0.668) (0.662) (0.649) (0.662) (0.631) (0.636) (0.605) (0.670) (0.355) 
LANG 0.116 -0.027 0.171 -0.015 0.151 -0.003 0.027 -0.030 1.300*** 
 (0.370) (0.381) (0.389) (0.382) (0.373) (0.381) (0.380) (0.383) (0.417) 
RTA -0.910** -0.881** -0.393 -0.853** -0.736* -0.814** -0.695* -0.892** 0.902*** 
 (0.394) (0.390) (0.448) (0.390) (0.384) (0.390) (0.400) (0.392) (0.320) 
Religion 3.774*** 4.403*** 4.378*** 4.368*** 3.938*** 4.377*** 4.396*** 4.394*** -3.028* 
 (1.106) (1.292) (1.325) (1.287) (1.191) (1.285) (1.305) (1.291) (1.699) 
Voice & accountabilityi -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.052*** -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) 
Government effectivenessi 0.069*** 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.076*** -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) 
Control of corruptioni -0.007 -0.007 -0.017 -0.008 -0.012 -0.007 -0.011 -0.007 0.044*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) 
Voice & accountabilityij 0.075 0.051 0.446 0.141 0.043 0.147 0.037 0.077 -0.039 
 (0.317) (0.293) (0.285) (0.288) (0.260) (0.266) (0.246) (0.328) (0.185) 
Government effectivenessij 0.510 0.637 0.605* 0.639* 0.628* 0.470 0.460 0.677* 0.229 
 (0.374) (0.390) (0.365) (0.387) (0.327) (0.347) (0.332) (0.396) (0.339) 
Control of corruptionij -0.315 -0.311 -0.694** -0.351 -0.432 -0.295 -0.487 -0.321 -0.900* 
 (0.395) (0.389) (0.346) (0.383) (0.339) (0.365) (0.380) (0.386) (0.472) 
Importer FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Product FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Observations 9,722 10,186 5,093 13,228 5,093 13,228 56,023 9,722 2,502 
R-squared 0.681 0.573 0.863 0.352 0.664 0.394 0.442 0.681 0.832 
Clustered standard errors by country pair in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent variables are trade values in 1000 USD; Voice & accountabilityij, government effectivenessij, and 
control of corruptionij mean dissimilarity of institutional quality, thus a negative sign should be interpreted as a trade increasing effect if two countries are more similar; coefficients are interpreted as 
elasticities; production refers to coconut production in the coconut sectors, and total agricultural production (minus coconut production) in the remaining agricultural sector.




Table 2.13: Institutional quality and coconut exports: importers with negative aggregate indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
Dependent variables Copra Coir Coconut 
Oil 
Oilcake Milk/Water Activated Carbon Fresh or Dried Aggregate Remaining agricultural sector  
lnDIST -9.110*** -0.354 1.167 -16.582** -1.267*** -0.550 -0.730** -1.131 -0.448***  
 (1.943) (0.332) (0.875) (8.272) (0.328) (0.561) (0.330) (0.702) (0.150)  
lnGDP -9.640*** 1.911*** 0.182 -1.564 1.702** 1.323*** 1.231*** 0.638 1.086***  
 (2.335) (0.683) (0.202) (2.325) (0.681) (0.251) (0.426) (0.458) (0.113)  
lnProduction 0.808** 1.345*** 2.178*** 4.913*** 0.634*** 0.836*** 0.710*** 1.113*** 0.584***  
 (0.350) (0.248) (0.373) (1.173) (0.148) (0.105) (0.137) (0.150) (0.047)  
Contig -0.538 0.718 -2.209 -12.631* -0.124 -0.156 0.300 -0.205 1.346***  
 (4.053) (0.642) (1.488) (7.439) (0.452) (0.492) (0.440) (0.474) (0.322)  
LANG 3.009* -0.344 -0.826 6.012 1.091*** -1.647*** 0.032 1.471* 0.147  
 (1.557) (0.776) (0.695) (3.952) (0.411) (0.557) (0.678) (0.846) (0.287)  
RTA 1.312 1.790** 0.333 2.770** -0.576* 0.939 0.448 0.521 -0.124  
 (1.417) (0.775) (0.787) (1.394) (0.335) (0.782) (0.450) (0.638) (0.238)  
Religion -4.385* -5.840** 14.103*** 22.137 -2.965 5.619*** 1.329 4.366*** 1.193  
 (2.463) (2.712) (5.102) (14.359) (2.258) (2.087) (2.527) (1.336) (1.462)  
Voice & accountabilityi 0.032 -0.086*** -0.054*** -0.053 -0.068*** -0.078*** -0.042*** -0.040*** -0.000  
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.072) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005)  
Government effectivenessi -0.099*** -0.031 0.096*** -0.103* 0.088*** 0.075*** 0.039** 0.060*** -0.016  
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.053) (0.014) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013)  
Control of corruptioni 0.002 0.104*** 0.013 0.195*** -0.010 0.036 -0.031** -0.024 0.010  
 (0.018) (0.036) (0.032) (0.057) (0.013) (0.029) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013)  
Voice & accountabilityij -2.342*** -0.723*** 0.170 -2.259* 0.201 0.985*** -0.173 0.067 0.220  
 (0.751) (0.280) (0.558) (1.333) (0.279) (0.299) (0.268) (0.284) (0.198)  
Government effectivenessij -0.267 0.885 1.232* -1.108 0.750** -1.007* -0.127 0.945* -1.172**  
 (1.074) (0.833) (0.689) (0.760) (0.345) (0.579) (0.440) (0.490) (0.476)  
Control of corruptionij 4.149*** -0.840 0.132 3.675*** -0.446* -0.798 -1.438*** -0.627* 0.029  
 (0.760) (0.798) (0.511) (1.261) (0.258) (0.877) (0.370) (0.368) (0.608)  
Importer FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Product FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Observations 2,942 7,995 5,884 2,942 11,027 2,942 11,027 32,362 4,967 
R-squared 0.862 0.513 0.660 0.965 0.455 0.592 0.244 0.248 0.833  
Clustered standard errors by country pair in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent variables are trade values in 1000 USD; Voice & accountabilityij, government effectivenessij, and 
control of corruptionij mean dissimilarity of institutional quality, thus a negative sign should be interpreted as a trade increasing effect if two countries are more similar; coefficients are interpreted as 
elasticities; production refers to coconut production in the coconut sectors, and total agricultural production (minus coconut production) in the remaining agricultural sector




2.6 Discussion  
Our first baseline results show that the overall institutional environment, as measured by an 
averaging the six governance indicators, does not have a concrete influence on the trade of 
coconut products.  This finding fails to confirm H1.  It, however, does better facilitate trade in 
all other agricultural products.  By averaging the six indicators, we assume that each indicator 
has the same weights. Hence, each indicator in H2, H3, and H4 are tested under a given setting 
of whether countries have aggregate positive or negative average scores.   
Our results reveal some patterns. Voice and accountability have mostly a diminishing effect on 
trade flows and government effectiveness increases trade aside from low-value-added products. 
The results for control of corruption are less clear-cut. Consistent with our hypothesis, not every 
indicator has the same effect on each of the product categories.  The findings are also similar to 
those of Meon and Sekkat (2008), who suggest that the different features of institutions yield 
dissimilar influences on trade.    
H2 of this study states that voice and accountability decrease the trade of coconut products.  
Our results confirm this hypothesis for almost all of the products assessed in both categories of 
exporters and importers.  This is consistent with the findings of Berden et al., (2014) who find 
that higher levels of voice and accountability negatively affect trade flows and levels of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and Martinez-Zarzoso and Ramos (2018), whose findings show lower 
levels of exports in the Middle East and North African countries.  In positive exporters, the 
effect size is quite noteworthy for coconut oil at 14.5 % as coconut oil is the most traded coconut 
product globally.  Yet, in negative exporting countries, there is no effect. We conclude that 
more voice and rights to laborers and farmers disrupt the processing and export of coconut 
products in producing countries that have a better overall institutional setting. Low-value-added 
products are just as affected perhaps due to the labor-intensive procedures involved, for 
example, the drying of copra and the weaving of coir products. We observe that this indicator 
has no effect on the trade of all other agricultural products across the board. H3 asserts that 
government effectiveness increases bilateral trade of, especially high-value products. This is 
confirmed by our results across all high-value product categories.  We infer from this result that 
further processing of coconuts is facilitated by the provision of complementary services and 
contract enforcement. However, while we expected that government effectiveness would also 
increase trade in low-value products, albeit to a lesser extent than for high-value products, our 
results show that this is not the case.  Trade of some low-value-added products is decreased in 
the positive exporter and negative importer 




category. It’s possible that countries have better average scores export more high-value 
products at the expense of those with lesser value.  More than half of the negative importing 
countries are also coconut exporters.  It’s probable that countries like the Philippines and 
Indonesia need their copra to extract oil and have no need to export them to countries in this 
category. 
H4 states that better control of corruption increases trade of all coconut categories. Here, the 
results are less obvious.  Notably, in importing countries with positive scores, it has no effect 
on any of the product categories, yet, trade of the remaining agricultural sector benefits.  The 
literature is also mixed in this regard. While some of the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant, there is no clear pattern in its effects according to product categories among the 
exporter categories. Our results confirm that the effects of corruption in coconut trade are 
complex and we cannot conclude whether it fits the “grease the wheel”  or “sand the wheel” 
argument discussed by Ben Ali and Mdhillat (2015). 
H5 states that institutional similarities would increase trade flows.  This is not supported by our 
results. First, similarities in government effectiveness show mostly decreasing effects for 
coconut products, yet, it increases the trade of all other agricultural products in the same 
countries, except in positive importing countries. This suggests that similarities in this indicator, 
in fact, redirect trade away from coconut products towards all other categories of agricultural 
commodities.  A second reason could be that most of the coconut producing countries score 
generally lower in government effectiveness than the most important importing countries. This, 
together with the producing countries’ natural endowments of coconut trees may serve as an 
explanation of the negative trade effect of similarities. With this argument, we shadow Meon 
and Sekkat (2008) who suggest that when nations have natural endowments of a commodity 
that determine their comparative advantage, in this case, coconuts, then the influence of 
institutions might be of subordinate importance, or in our case even negative due to limited 
alternatives.  Another possibility could be that government effectiveness in most importing 
countries has improved from 1996 to 2016, whereas for some exporting countries, scores have 
decreased, increasing the distance of similarities in this indicator.  One further explanation 
could be the role of informal institutions.  Many of coconut producing countries are emerging 
markets whose exchange relationships could often rely on informal and network-based norms 
(Yang et al., 2018).  Furthermore, social networks could weaken the effect of formal 
institution’s legal enforceability (Yang et al., 2018).  
Similarities in voice and accountability and control of corruption show mixed trade effects 
across different categories of exporters and importers.  It differs considerably depending on the 




exporter/importer categories. Even though control of corruption does not make a pronounced 
effect on coconut trade itself, we do see that similarities in this indicator with negative exporter 
and importer categories lead to an increase in aggregate coconut products.  Since this result 
holds for countries with negative aggregate scores, this could suggest that two countries with 
equally bad levels of corruption trade more with each other.  As Ben Ali and Mdhillat (2015) 
and Horsewood and Voicu (2012) suggest, if two states think that bribery in business 
transactions is tolerated, then this could increase their trade transactions with each other. Our 
results are mostly consistent with the literature on the effect of traditional gravity variables. 
2.7 Conclusions  
Studies to date suggest that institutional quality is a determinant of bilateral trade.  This is due 
to effects such as a reduction in transaction costs and better contract enforcement.  We add to 
the literature by studying the effect and influence of institutions on the international trade 
performance of coconuts by using an extended structural gravity model.  We first assess how 
the overall institutional environment, as measured by an average of the six World Bank’s world 
governance indicators, influence the export performance of coconut products. Our results do 
not show that the overall institutional environment leads to an increase in the export of coconut 
products.  We then measure the effects of three indicators according to categories of positive 
and negative exporting and importing countries  
We hypothesize that an increase in government effectiveness and control of corruption 
indicators to increase bilateral trade flows of coconut products.  At the same time, we expect 
better performance in voice and accountability would have negative trade effects.  Lastly, we 
argue that trade would increase between the two countries when they share similarities in the 
three respective indicators.  Our results support some, but not all of these hypotheses. We 
confirm that institutional quality matters for the trade of coconut products with variations in 
different institutional environments. Government effectiveness plays a bigger role in enhancing 
trade of high-value products, while voice and accountability decrease trade of both high-value 
and low-value-added coconut products.  The effect size of these findings is comparable in 
importing countries with negative aggregate indicator scores.  Contrary to the findings of 
Bojnec and Fertő (2009), we fail to confirm the hypothesis that two countries similar in 
institutions lead to an increase in bilateral trade.  We should note that while some indicators 
show negative effects in certain categories of coconut products, the effects on the export 
performance in the remaining agricultural sectors are either positive or statistically insignificant. 




Existing literature on institutional quality on export performance only assessed trade in general, 
or in certain aggregate sectors.  Product and institutional indicator-specific studies are lacking. 
Our study is a first attempt to close this literature gap by considering institutional and product 
heterogeneities. Although our results provide evidence that government effectiveness is more 
important than voice and accountability and control of corruption in fostering trade of high-
value coconut products, country-specific case studies for different coconut producing regions 
are needed that may complement our findings.  
One limitation of our study is that the institutional indicators do not allow us to assess 
specifically to individual product categories.  We have in part addressed this by showing the 
trade effect for the entire agricultural sector.  However, in a macro-level study, we are unable 
to identify winners and losers individually with institutional indicators that assess the entire 
economy. Our study focuses exclusively on coconut exports, therefore, our findings should not 
be seen as transferrable to other crops and commodities.  Further research is needed in other 
agricultural products with various levels of value addition to study the influence of institutions 
and governance on international market integration.  This would allow for more general 
conclusions, while our results are sector-specific.   
Our results produce a number of policy implications.  Many countries in our study vary in their 
individual indicators. While aggregating the scores gives an impression of the institutional 
environment of the country, it’s still difficult to assess whether a country scoring high on 
government effectiveness and low on control of corruption says about their overall institutional 
setting.  We address this in our study by looking at indicators individually.            
Improving government effectiveness is crucial for strengthening exports in coconuts, which is 
a sector of major economic relevance in many of our exporting nations.  Despite findings that 
show a decrease in coconut trade when there is an increase in voice and accountability it also 
has a neutral effect on the entire agricultural sector, hinting that countries with higher levels of 
voice and accountability do not necessarily suffer on an aggregate level, only the coconut sector. 
Furthermore, it would not be unreasonable to predict that voice and accountability could have 
an effect similar to the Kuznet’s (1955) curve. As this indicator first increases, it disrupts the 
coconut processing stage.  However, once it reaches a certain turning point, the effect it has on 










Table A2.1: Exporting and importing economies 
Country Groups Members 
Exporters Brazil, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Ghana, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kiribati, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mexico, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Vanuatu, Venezuela, 
Vietnam 
   
Importers Australia, Canada, China, EU27, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, USA 
 
Table A2.2: Correlation table of the three governance indicators in exporting countries 
 VA GE CC 
VA 1.0000   
GE 0.1859 1.0000  
CC 0.5493 0.5824 1.0000 
 
Table A2.3: Correlation table of institutional similarities between exporting and importing 
regions 
 VAij GEij CCij 
VAij 1.0000   
GEij 0.1723 1.0000  
CCij 0.2772 0.8243 1.0000 
 
Table A2.4: Harmonized System (HS) codes and Average Unit Values 
HS Code Product Avg. Unit Value 
1203 Copra .403 
080111 Fresh or dried, desiccated 1.416 
080119 Fresh or dried, other than desiccated .409 
151311 Coconut oil and its fractions, crude .833 
151319 Coconut oil and its fractions, other than crude 1.097 
200819 Nut milk, including coconut 3.062 
220290 Plant-based water, including coconut .808 
230650 Oil-cake and other residues, from the extraction of copra .145 
380210 Activated carbon 1.34 
530511 Coconut coir, raw .261 
530519 Coconut coir, other .263 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
 





With the exception of Cote d'Ivoire, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Vietnam, all other coconut 
producing countries listed in this study almost exclusively only produce coconuts according to nuts that 
are used to produce HS Code 200819. 
Table A2.5: Share of coconut to total nut production in five countries 
Country Share of Coconut to Total Nut Production 






Table A2.6: World governance indicator scores in exporting countries in 1996 and 2016 







Brazil 0.24 0.47 -0.14 -0.18 -0.02 -0.44 0.01 
China -1.36 -1.62 -0.35 0.36 -0.27 -0.25 -0.53 
Côte d'Ivoire -0.58 -0.28 -0.26 -0.67 -0.26 -0.54 -0.98 
Dominican Republic 0.06 0.19 -0.22 -0.25 -0.42 -0.78 -0.32 
Fiji 0.15 -0.03 -0.12 -0.26 0.66 0.13 -0.21 
Ghana -0.21 0.64 -0.12 -0.20 -0.34 -0.17 -0.01 
India 0.48 0.41 -0.11 0.10 -0.38 -0.30 -0.25 
Indonesia -0.92 0.14 -0.71 0.01 -0.86 -0.39 -0.56 
Jamaica 0.59 0.69 0.14 0.41 0.19 -0.16 0.05 
Kiribati 1.15 1.03  -0.45  0.25 0.10 
Malaysia -0.18 -0.47 0.54 0.88 0.38 0.11 0.35 
Marshall Islands 1.23 1.20  -1.56  -0.06 -0.07 
Mexico -0.04 -0.09 0.23 0.14 -0.51 -0.77 -0.13 
Mozambique -0.28 -0.39 -0.14 -0.85 -0.42 -0.87 -0.39 
Myanmar -1.89 -0.85 -1.21 -0.98 -1.50 -0.65 -1.52 
Nigeria -1.55 -0.30 -0.92 -1.09 -1.19 -1.04 -1.13 
Papua New Guinea 0.08 0.19 -0.34 -0.73 -0.43 -0.92 -0.61 
Philippines 0.26 0.14 -0.31 -0.01 -0.36 -0.53 -0.37 
Samoa 0.74 0.76 0.39 0.54 -0.03 0.28 -0.51 
Solomon Islands 0.81 0.49  -0.99 0.34 -0.34 -0.48 
Sri Lanka -0.27 -0.11 -0.18 -0.21 -0.06 -0.28 -0.31 
Tanzania -0.64 -0.18 -0.69 -0.55 -0.70 -0.51 -0.43 
Thailand 0.31 -1.10 0.18 0.34 -0.36 -0.40 -0.12 
Vanuatu 0.63 0.69  -0.88 0.22 -0.10 0.16 
Vietnam -1.09 -1.41 -0.58 0.01 -0.49 -0.40 -1.11 
 
 




Table A2.7: World governance indicator scores in importing countries in 1996 and 2016 
Importer VA 1996 VA 2016 GE 
1996 
GE2016 CC 1996 CC2016 Average 
Australia 1.44 1.30 1.80 1.58 1.88 1.77 1.59 
Canada 1.57 1.38 1.74 1.80 2.03 1.98 1.63 
China -1.36 -1.62 -0.35 0.36 -0.27 -0.25 -0.52 
Hong Kong 0.33 0.27 1.04 1.86 1.44 1.58 1.31 
Indonesia -0.92 0.14 -0.71 0.01 -0.86 -0.39 -0.60 
Japan 1.07 1.00 0.91 1.83 1.19 1.51 1.19 
Korea 0.67 0.63 0.47 1.07 0.38 0.37 0.69 
Lao PDR -1.13 -1.73 -0.64 -0.39 -0.72 -0.93 -0.92 
Malaysia -0.18 -0.47 0.54 0.88 0.38 0.11 0.35 
Philippines 0.26 0.14 -0.31 -0.01 -0.36 -0.53 -0.34 
Russian Federation -0.22 -1.21 -0.45 -0.22 -1.05 -0.86 -0.73 
Singapore 0.14 -0.28 1.99 2.21 2.11 2.07 1.50 
Thailand 0.31 -1.10 0.18 0.34 -0.36 -0.40 -0.07 
United States 1.35 1.10 1.52 1.48 1.57 1.33 1.33 

































This paper explores the institutional challenges and opportunities in Fiji’s integration into the 
global value chain.  Fiji is naturally endowed with coconut palms across its many islands. 
However, the coconut sector remains rudimentary with little value-addition. Coconut products 
of high-value are now being produced and exported throughout the world.  While many coconut 
producing countries have benefitted from this coconut demand surge, Fiji has been unable to 
benefit from the international market. This study utilizes a mixed-methods approach to analyze 
the challenges and opportunities. First, we looked on a macro-level at the link between 
institutional quality and Fiji’s export of coconut products. Then, we look in-depth by 
conducting semi-structured interviews with stakeholder groups in Fiji to gain an understanding 
of the perceived challenges and opportunities. Our empirical results show that increased scores 
in the government effectiveness and voice and accountability indicators enhance coconut 
exports from Fiji, suggesting that domestic institutions play an important role. Interviews with 
key actors reveal that communications among each stakeholder group are fragmented. The main 
institutional actors and the producers have different perceptions of the industry’s challenges, 
thus resulting in different ideas on how to address the issues.  There is potential for Fiji to 
benefit from the current coconut boom.  Institutional actors and producers need to gain an 
understanding of each other’s perceptions and make an effort to work together toward a 
common goal. 
Keywords: Coconuts, Fiji, Global Value Chains, Institutions, Qualitative Analysis 
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In the last few decades, there have been significant changes in the agricultural and food industry 
in developing countries.  This, together with increasing demands for exotic commodities, such 
as coconuts, has provided opportunities for many of these countries to participate in global 
agrifood chains (Trienekens and Willems 2007).  Studies to date suggest that small and remote 
countries have much to gain by global integration, such as increases in specialization, 
economies of scale, and income (Breisinger et al. 2019; Kowalski et al. 2015; Streeten 1993). 
In addition, international trade can reap more benefits to small economies than larger ones due 
to economies of scale, increasing returns, and capital accumulation for its economic 
development (Streeten, 1993).   
There has been an increase in international demand for coconut products in recent years. 
Coconuts are now increasingly being transformed into high-value and niche products that 
require more complex processing and innovations throughout the global value chain.  This 
current trend is largely driven by non-traditional products, such as coconut milk and coconut 
water (Abdulsamad, 2016).  Historically, the production and trade of coconuts centered on 
coconut oil.  Today, more than 40 coconut products are being produced and traded worldwide 
(FAO 2013) and the number is increasing.   
Fiji is naturally endowed with coconut palms.  Coconuts, in the form of copra (dried coconut 
flesh from which oil is extracted), is one of the main agricultural products while crude coconut 
oil is one of the main export commodities (CIA 2019).  The Fijian agricultural sector plays a 
large role in the country’s economy as it contributes to 13.5% of the country’s economy and 
makes up 44 % of the labor force (CIA 2019).  Today, coconuts are considered mostly as raw 
materials as there are minimal value-adding activities in Fiji.  Because of this, farmers in Fiji 
are dependent on and vulnerable to world market prices, thus, increasing the uncertainty of their 
livelihood options (FAO 2013). Yet, with this current coconut product diversification boom, 
there is potential to generate incentives for value-adding activities (FAO 2013).  The returns for 
farmers and firms are higher if they have market opportunities for them to shift production away 
from processing copra.  Doing so can lead to higher profits for farmers.  It is estimated in the 
international market that the average price paid for one coconut is around 11 US cents if sold 
as crude coconut oil, 33 cents as desiccated coconuts, and 55 cents as either coconut milk or 
coconut water (FAO 2013).   
While many coconut producing countries, such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka, are benefitting 
from this surge in global coconut demand, other countries such as Fiji have yet to be integrated 
into the international market.  Copra was once one of the major export commodities of Fiji, 




however, the industry has since been deteriorating due to sharp declining international price 
trends and damages caused by natural disasters. The lack of knowledge, assets, technologies, 
and market access has further hindered Fiji to participate in this current global coconut demand.  
Furthermore, Fiji’s geographical location is prone to frequent cyclones and floods.  These 
factors further increase farmers’ risk and the need for institutional efforts to manage and 
facilitate the value-addition process. The Fijian government has implemented programs and 
policies throughout the years aimed to tackle these problems.  Despite the efforts, many 
schemes have yet to be successful.  These recurring failed efforts prove to be inefficient and 
crowd out spending that could be used for other agricultural activities (ADB 2013).   
Institutional arrangements have the ability to better facilitate cooperation among different actors 
that can ease market fluctuations and reduce transaction costs (Arias et al. 2013).  Institutional 
quality can influence whether countries only export low-value products, or whether they can 
integrate into more complex value chains (Dollar & Kidder, 2017).  Dollar et al. (2016) find 
that different measures of domestic institutional quality influence a country's participation in 
global value chains.  Within the coconut trade, Lin et al. (2020) find that higher scores in 
government effectiveness lead to an increase in trade of high-value coconut products.  
At the same time, past research has not looked into specific case studies to understand why or 
how countries integrate into the global coconut value chain. 
The objective of this study is to explore the potential for Fiji to integrate into the global coconut 
value chain.  More specifically, we look at the role of formal institutions in facilitating this 
process.  We add to the literature by utilizing a mixed-methods approach to address our 
objectives.  We first look at macro-level trade effects by using three indicators from the World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicator’s (WGI) index and assess their influence on Fiji’s coconut 
exports to the top 15 coconut importing countries in the world. To further support our 
quantitative analysis, we then look qualitatively into a case study.  We conducted semi-
structured interviews with actors from several stakeholder groups in Fiji to gain a better 
understanding of the complex issues.  The goal is to understand the perceptions of key 
stakeholder groups in the sector.  We aim to answer the following research questions:  
 
R1. What is the role of formal institutions in facilitating Fiji’s global integration? 
R2: What are the challenges and opportunities perceived by each actor? 
 
The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview of the Fijian 
coconut industry and some of the country’s existing conditions.  We then review the literature 




on institutions and global value chains in section 3.  Section 4 introduces our methodology and 
research area.  We present our results in section 5 followed by a discussion.  Finally, section 6 
concludes. 
3.2 Background 
Coconut palms have often been referred to as the “tree of life.”  Not only are they a raw material 
source, but they also play an integral role in the traditional lifestyles in Pacific Island countries 
(Green 1991).  For smallholders in the Pacific Island countries, coconut palms are key to income 
generation, nutritional consumption, and materials for construction, weaving, and vessels 
(Warner 2007).   
Coconut production is a year-round activity.  Around 90% of coconuts are cultivated on small 
farms, ranging between 0.5 to four hectares (Prades et al. 2016).  Coconut palms start to flower 
between four to ten years after planting and can live to 100 years (Foale, 2003).  Harvest of nuts 
is usually done one year after flowering (Batugal, et al., 2005).  Coconuts have the potential to 
generate high economic returns if utilized appropriately since all parts of the coconut tree and 
fruit can be processed into both edible and inedible products (Balawan 2010).   
The coconut industry in Fiji began in 1873 when the islands were ceded to Queen Victoria of 
England and became a colony under the monarchy. The following year, coconut plantations 
began to flourish.  By 1877, copra became Fiji’s major export (Silsoe 1963).  During the Second 
World War, Australian trading companies began milling copra into oil within the country.  Due 
to the instability of coconut oil prices, the Fijian government introduced the Copra Stabilization 
Scheme in 1975 to ease the global price fluctuations.  The now state-owned Copra Millers was 
built in 1983 in an effort to support smallholder farmers to gain a stable source of income.  In 
the mid to late 1980s, world oil prices collapsed.  This so-called oil glut was caused by an 
oversupply of crude oil after the energy crisis that occurred in the late seventies.  Since then, 
copra and coconut oil prices have been fluctuating, as shown in figure 3.1.  In 1998, the Coconut 
Industry Development Authority Act was established with the intention to resuscitate the 
coconut sector with research and extension services (Bula n.d.). The Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) commissioned an appraisal of the coconut industry report in Fiji in 2008, 
yet, little has changed since the dissemination of the report.  In February of 2016, Hurricane 
Winston, a category five cyclone, struck Fiji, devastating much of the country’s agricultural 
land and infrastructure.  The estimated damage to the crop and livestock sector is estimated at 
104 million US Dollars (Wall 2016).  Many coconut plantations were severely damaged, with 
many still yet to fully recover after two years.  





Figure 3.1: Monthly price of coconut oil since 1989; source (Indexmundi) 
Coconut palms take up around 23% of arable land in Fiji (FAO, 2008).  Copra production 
drastically decreased in the past decades from an estimated 41,000 tons in the 1950s to less than 
7,000 tons in 2012 as shown in figure 3.2 (FAO 2013).  Reasons for decreased production 
include labor scarcity and low returns from copra, natural disasters, expiring land leases, and 
other competing shorter-term crops such as kava and taro (FAO 2013).  
Around 70% of coconut palms are estimated to be senile in Fiji (FAO 2013), meaning that they 
are past the years of increasing productivity level.  The declining productivity of palms has 
proved to be a significant challenge for the country’s coconut sector. The government of Fiji 
has implemented replanting programs in the past and present.  It has set the priority for coconut 
production to reach the level to that of 1977 as part of the country’s 2020 agriculture sector 
policy agenda. Yet, despite the efforts, replanting schemes have so far not been successful.  
Some constraints are specific to Fiji.  A report by the FAO in 2013 identified the main 
challenges to the Fijian coconut sector as the following: high transportation costs, labor scarcity, 
low returns, senile palms, higher returns from crops such as kava and taro, and natural disasters, 
such as cyclones.  Additionally, other external factors, such as the aggressive promotion of palm 
oil in countries such as Indonesia have largely affected the price and competitiveness of coconut 






































































































































































Coconut Oil Monthly Price 





Figure 3.2: Fiji’s copra production in metric tons; source: FAOSTAT 
The coconut harvest method in Fiji consists of collecting nuts that have fallen to the ground.  
This method differs from other harvesting techniques that consist of picking nuts from the palm 
by climbing (Green 1991).  This harvesting technique poses several disadvantages.  First, the 
nuts can be lost, particularly in overgrowing groves that are unmanaged.  Second, the delay of 
time in nut collection can lead to germination, reducing both the quantity and the quality of the 
coconuts. Lastly, inadequate storage time and copra drying methods result in inconsistent and 
inferior quality of copra that is prone to aflatoxin contaminations (Balawan 2010). The methods 
of harvesting and copra processing have been passed down for generations.  Unless there are 
opportunities for higher earnings, there is little incentive to alter the current production 
techniques nor will farmers replant (Balawan 2010).   
Many farmers and small producers lack the knowledge and ability to diversify their production 
(Selwyn, 2008).  There is no current edible oil market on a commercial scale.  Without the 
technological knowledge and machines needed for the production of higher value-added 
products, small countries in the Pacific can only rely on the export of crude oil to other coconut 
producing countries, such as the Philippines, who have machinery in place for further value 
addition (Young and Pelomo, 2014).   
The land ownership system of the country is limiting economic development (Prasad & Tisdell, 
1996).  Most coconut producing land belongs to the category of “native land”, which accounts 
for almost 90% of land in Fiji and belongs to the native communities. The land is governed by 
the iTaukei Land Trust Board (TLTB).  In effect, this kind of land is owned by village chiefs in 
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collecting coconuts and processing copra is decided within the clans of the communities 
(Bawalan 2010). Though lands can be leased through customary land rights holders to investors, 
it nonetheless creates the “common goods” problem.  Farmers have little incentive to properly 
manage and clean coconut groves because they do not have ownership of the land.  The lack of 
land ownership means farmers do not have secure collateral to access credit and loans (Duncan 
& Sing, 2009).  Additionally, this type of tenure system is at odds with the commercial interests 
of private industries, thus limiting business investments (Boydell, 2010).   
While these circumstances may put Fiji at a disadvantage to integrate globally, they do not 
completely hinder Fiji’s capacity to integrate into global value chains.  According to an 
assessment by McGregor (2007) of capabilities to export high-value agricultural products, Fiji 
scores higher than other countries in the Pacific Islands in terms of market access opportunities.  
One reason is that Fiji already has an established and consistent freight shipments to markets in 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the United States (McGregor, 2007).  In 2016, Fiji exported 
almost US$ 90 million worth of agricultural commodities and products, with taro, cassava, 
green ginger, eggplant, and kava as the top export commodities (Fiji Department of Agriculture). 
Much trade takes place through regional and multilateral agreements with Australia, New 
Zealand, and the European Union (Juswanto & Ali, 2014).  The South Pacific Regional Trade 
and Economic Co-operation Agreement (SPARTECA) between Pacific Island countries and 
Australia and New Zealand allow for duty-free access to certain markets.  Given that Fiji 
already has established trade access, its remoteness should not be seen as a major impediment 
for the coconut sector to integrate on a global level. 
3.3 Theoretical concepts 
This section gives an overview of value chain concepts and institutions. We then link 
institutions and their role in a country’s participation in global value chains. 
Value chains are defined as “the full range of activities which are required to bring a product 
or service from conception, through the different phases of production, delivery to final 
consumers, and final disposal after use” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p. 4).  They are 
considered as networks that support physical, financial, and informational flows (Angelucci & 
Conforti, 2010). These flows are seen as effective ways to support and promote smallholder 
farmers and their incomes via market integration and value addition (Angelucci & Conforti, 
2010).  The value chain idea was conceptualized by Porter (1985) to assess firms’ competitive 
advantage.  The concept is then widely discussed to address the process of exchanges of 
commodities and the coordination of processing along a chain on a global scale (Gereffi 1994; 




Gereffi et al. 2005; Kaplinsky and Morris 2001; Ponte and Gibbon 2005).  More recently, there 
have been discussions on the role of institutions in global value chain participation (Dollar et 
al. 2016; Dollar and Kidder 2017) and international trade (Álvarez et al. 2018; Martínez-
Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos 2018; Meon and Sekkat 2008).  These studies suggest that better 
institutions lead to better international integration and increased trade. 
We define institutions after North (1991, p. 97) as “the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interactions.”  We are interested in what the author calls 
the “formal rules” of institutions, which are constitutions, laws, and property rights (North 
1991).  Institutions have the ability to influence and facilitate each step of the value chain. As 
value chains become more complex and differentiated, the role of legal institutions become 
more crucial (Dollar & Kidder, 2017).  Countries with better institutions are able to facilitate 
long-term contracts and agreements at different stages along the value chain, which allows for 
an increase in exports of products with more complex processing (Martincus & Gallo, 2009).   
As agricultural production becomes more mechanized and capital intensive, the focus within 
value chains has increasingly shifted from primary production to processing and value addition 
(Diao et al. 2014; El-Enbaby et al. 2016; Breisinger & Diao, 2008).  An upgrade in value chains 
can have beneficial spill-over effects on other areas of the economy (Breisinger et al. 2019).  
Furthermore, developing agricultural value chains can be pro-poor in the case of poorer 
households engaging in the value chain as a primary activity and earning higher farm revenues 
or the household consuming the final product at lower prices (Breisinger et al., 2019). 
Mohan (2016) finds that upgrading value chains can bring profit opportunities for small firms, 
especially when local institutions contribute to the process.  In Kenya, smallholders who 
participate in avocado export markets are associated with higher levels of income (Amare et al., 
2019). Deans et al. (2018) find in their research on cocoa value chains in Ghana that a more 
integrated approach has a positive effect on the social, human, and natural capital of farmers 
than conventional value chain collaborations.  In the Kenyan flower sector, Zylberberg (2013) 
illustrates that integration into the world market can reduce price fluctuations and risk for 
farmers.  The coconut sector in Fiji can be likened to that of the cocoa industry in Africa, albeit 
at a much smaller scale, where the production involves mostly smallholder farmers who are in 
a vulnerable position in fluctuating market conditions (Barrientos & Asenso-Okyere, 2009). In 
order to stay competitive in the fast-changing international market, there is a need for product 
innovation to create new markets and differentiate itself from traditional markets. Natural 
disasters, political instability, and market fluctuations further disrupt the value-chain process. 
As value chains become more complex and the distance between destinations lengthened, the 




vulnerabilities and risks involved increase. To mitigate these potential risks, a value chain 
network that facilitates information exchange between stakeholders should be created 
(Christopher & Peck, 2004).        
 3.4 Methodology 
We utilize a mixed-methods approach to answer our four research questions as proposed in 
section 1.  Specifically, we address RQ1 by looking on a macro-level at the role of different 
domestic institutional indicators on coconut exports.  Next, we use qualitative methods to 
answer RQ2.  This is done by conducting semi-structured interviews with key stakeholder 
groups to grasp the various perceptions of each group. 
Trade Effects 
Following Lin et al. (2020), we assess the role of institutions on Fiji’s coconut export 
performance to the top 15 coconut importing countries.  To estimate the determinants of 
bilateral trade flows in coconut products, we gather trade data and proxies for trade costs from 
various sources for the years 1996-2016.  We obtain bilateral coconut trade data from the United 
Nations Commodity Trade (UNComtrade) database, via the World Integrated Trading System.  
We use data on import values by the 15 largest importers of coconut products from Fiji 
measured in US Dollars. Import data is considered to be more dependable since governments 
have higher incentives to track imports for tax purposes (Francois & Manchin, 2013). 
To measure institutional quality, we utilize the World Bank’s WGIs from the years 1996 to 
2016.  The World Bank published the indicators bi-yearly from 1996 to 2002, and annually 
since then.  For the years 1997, 1999, and 2001, the values from the previous year are used.  
The WGI is one of the most recognized and referenced indicators in research.  It is based on 
hundreds of variables created by 33 international organizations (Kaufmann et al. 2009).  The 
six indicators are scaled from -2.5 to 2.5.  Higher values correspond to better governance, where 
zero is the median score.   
For the purpose of our study, we categorize the six indicators into three dimensions (Lin et al., 
2020; Berden et al. 2014; Lio and Hu 2009; Lio and Liu 2008; Méon and Weill 2005).  One 
indicator is selected from each of the three dimensions of indicators: voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, and control of corruption.  Since the indicators are themselves 
correlated, each indicator could affect trade directly or indirectly by its influence on the other 
indicators (Lio and Liu 2008). To better interpret the results of our main variables of interest, 
we have rescaled the three indicators of the exporting countries to 1-100.  Figure 3.3 shows 
Fiji’s institutional indicator scores from 1996 to 2017.  We observe that all three indicator scores 




decreased severely in the late 2000s.  This is perhaps due to the political coup that took place 
in 2006.  The scores have since then recovered to levels above 0. 
 
Figure 3.3: Fiji’s world governance indicators score 1996-2017 
We obtain gravity model variables, which include the distance between the importing and 
exporting countries, gross domestic products (GDPs), indicators for sharing a common 
language, common religion, contiguity, and regional agreement come from the Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales.  We treat the European Union (EU) as a single 
importing entity in this study since a significant portion of coconuts and their processed 
products are exported to the Netherlands, and then re-exported to other countries within the EU 
27. Hence, the Netherlands is considered the destination for measuring bilateral distances.  A 
producing country is said to share a common official language with the EU 27 if it shares one 
of its official languages with at least one country in the EU 27. 
To estimate trade effects, we utilize the gravity model (Tinbergen 1962), which has been used 
extensively in trade literature, for our estimations.  The model in its basic form considers the 
geographical distance between the exporting and importing countries and the GDPs of both 
countries to represent the trade costs between the two (Shepherd, 2013).  The intuition behind 
the theory is that countries with larger GDPs or countries that are closer to each other have a 
larger gravity force that pulls them together (Feenstra and Taylor 2014), leading to greater 
volumes of trade.  To address the frequent occurrence of zero trade values, we adopt the Poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation method (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006).  
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𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡+𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡] ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡 
           (1) 
Data collection 
The qualitative aspect of this study is based on primary data collected over a six-week period 
from November to December 2018 in three areas within Fiji, shown in figure 3.4.  We first 
visited the capital city of Suva, where the Ministry of Agriculture and international 
organizations are based.  Field visits took place on the island of Taveuni and Vanua Levu where 
the majority of coconut plantations and smaller coconut groves are located.  The city of 
Savusavu, Vanua Levu is where the government-owned mill, Copra Millers, is located.  
Our data collection method involved semi-structured interviews with key actors from multiple 
stakeholder groups in the coconut sector.  To explore the perceptions of our respondents, we 
developed a list of pre-determined questions that allow for follow-up questions and discussions 
during the interviews.  Respondents were also asked about their forms of communication with 
other groups of stakeholders in order to identify the bottlenecks within the network of groups.   
We selected certain stakeholder categories based on purposive sampling.  Respondents were 
chosen based on their experience, involvement, and influence in the Fijian coconut value chain.   
 
Figure 3.4: Map of research sites in Fiji 




We interviewed a total of 34 respondents from several stakeholder groups including 
government officials, international researchers, academic researchers, farmers/copra processors, 
women’s group members, and private industries, as shown in Table 3.1.  Of the categories, 
farmers and women’s group members were selected using snowball sampling.  Participants 
were referred by informants in the research division of the Ministry of Agriculture.  Though the 
sample size does not equate a statistically designed sample, the aim is to capture multiple 
perceptions from each of the key stakeholder groups involved.   
Each interview was transcribed and analyzed using the NVivo 12 Pro software.  We identified 
issues and recurring themes that were mentioned and discussed by each actor.  The common 
themes were then grouped to identify the different perceptions of the interviewees to assess 
specific challenges, potentials, and other unforeseen factors.   
Table 3.1: Categories and number of stakeholder’s interviews 
Type Number of respondents 




Private industry (factories and farm estates) 5 
Copra Millers 2 
Farmer/Copra processor 12 
Virgin coconut oil maker (women’s group member) 6 
International consultants 3 
Total 34 
 
With the different groups of stakeholders, a communications network diagram was created 
according to the interviews to outline the type of relationships that exists among the different 
interest groups. 
3.5 Results 
Table 3.2 presents the results of our estimations on the effects of institutional quality on Fijian 
coconut exports.  Figures in brackets below the coefficients represent standard errors. 
Our results suggest that after accounting for standard gravity model determinants of trade such 
as distance and GDP, an increase in the voice and accountability and government effectiveness 
indicators leads to an increase in trade of coconut products from Fiji to the top 15 importing 
countries. A one-point increase in voice and accountability leads to a 2.7% increase in trade 
whereas a one-point increase in government effectiveness increases trade by 9.6%.  Conversely, 
control of corruption has the opposite effect on trade, where a one-point increase leads to an 
almost nine percent decrease in coconut exports from Fiji.  The effect sizes are notable for the 
indicators of government effectiveness and control of corruption. 




Table 3.2: Institutional quality and coconut exports from Fiji 









Common religion 1.983*** 
 (0.501) 
Voice and accountabilityi 0.027*** 
 (0.003) 
Government effectivenessi 0.096*** 
 (0.007) 
Control of corruptioni -0.088*** 
 (0.006) 
Time FE YES 
Importer FE YES 
Observations 32,175 
R-squared 0.091 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Coconut value chain in Fiji 
Our interviews confirm that coconuts are collected by hand on plantations and small farms after 
they have fallen off the palms.  Figure 3.5 shows the levels of value-addition and the actors 
involved in the activities from harvest to the export of crude coconut oil. The first level of 
mature coconut processing involves sorting, dehusking, taking out fresh kernels, and drying the 
kernel into copra.  Unlike other major coconut producing countries, this activity is done as an 
additional on-farm value addition activity by farmers who also collect coconuts on communal 
lands.  Almost every village member engages in the harvest of coconuts.  The ones who do not 
own a copra dryer collect whole nuts and sell to those who own a dryer.  By-products that 
emerge from this level of processing are coconut husks, which can be transformed into coir, 
and coconut shells, which are often made into activated carbon (charcoal) and handicrafts.  
These activities are mostly non-commercial. 
The next steps comprise of processing copra into crude coconut oil.  Farmers transport dehusked 
coconuts and/or copra to Copra Millers, who is the only buyer.  Alternatively, twice a week, 
Copra Millers sends out a truck to collect both copra and nuts from larger farmers in Vanua 
Levu.  The oil is pressed by the mill on a larger scale.  Because each farmer has his own set of 
hand-made copra dryers and different techniques of making copra, the quality of copra is 
inconsistent.  These copra ends up at Copra Millers for milling, resulting in crude oil, the end 




product, of varying quality.  The majority of crude oil is exported to countries such as Malaysia 
and Singapore for further processing into cosmetics.   
 
Figure 3.5: Coconut value chain in Fiji 
Virgin coconut oil (VCO) production exists on a small-scale level for domestic sales.  The 
product is mostly produced at the household level by members of local women’s groups. The 
production is either done by hand or by using a machine provided by the government. Many 
interviewees identify one farm that exports VCO to the United States.  However, this particular 
farmer refused our request for a visit, the production method is unknown. 
Table 3.3: Price comparison of different coconut items 
Item Average Price No. of coconuts 
Copra  $1000 per ton1 ~5000 
Whole coconuts  25 cents or 40 cents each 1 
Small whole coconut 10 cents per each 1 
Virgin coconut oil  $15 per 0.5 liter ~5 
1 One metric ton of copra produces around 610 kilograms of oil (World Bank, 1986).   
Table 3.3 shows a price comparison of the different value-added coconut items farmers and 
producers obtain.  Copra receives the lowest returns and is also the most labor-intensive.  
Selling whole coconuts would be more cost-effective for farmers, as there is no further 
processing involved.  The limiting factor is transporting the nuts as they are both heavy and 
bulky.  The trucks sent out by Copra Millers only go to larger plantations, thus, excluding 
smaller farmers.  
Communication network diagram 
We present the communication network diagram that outlines the stakeholder groups involved 
in the coconut sector and the different types of interactions and communication flows that take 
place, as adapted after  Oancea et al. (2017).  This diagram, shown in figure 3.6, is created based 
on the responses from our interviews.  There are three types of communication flows 
represented: information, human resources, and physical flows.  Information flow refers to the 
sharing of knowledge; human resources means skills and training provisions; and physical 
flows denote to the materials being exchanged, in our case, the sale of coconuts. Within the 
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Ministry of Agriculture, there is an extension division and a research division.  The extension 
division goes to farmers and women’s groups to collect information on how much copra and 
VCO are produced. The relationship is one-sided as farmers comment that extension officers 
don’t provide any information to them.  Extension workers mostly collect information from 
farmers, but rarely offer advice or assistance.  “They come and sit for five minutes and tell me 
stories about what they think, then you don’t hear from them for about another six months” 
(Farmer, Savusavu).   
 
Fig. 3.6: Communication network diagram of key stakeholder groups in Fiji’s coconut sector 
The extension team also selects the participants for VCO training while the members from the 
research divisions conduct training with the selected participants. “We don’t do the selection.  
The extension division selects, and we train. Extension officers are the bridge between farmers 
and the research division, we don’t communicate with the farmers” (Researcher, MOA).  
Furthermore, extension agents claim to have distributed seedlings to farmers for replanting 
strategies. Yet, most farmers interviewed claimed to not have received any seedlings from them.       
We can observe that communications with international actors take place with actors in the 
Ministry in the form of information exchange and human resources.  However, the main 
decision-making bodies do not exchange information with farmers nor women’s groups.  




International organizations, namely, the Pacific Community (SPC), an international 
organization that has a dominant presence in the Pacific Islands, implements and plans projects 
via the Ministry. However, no communication is observed between them and the farmers.   
There appears to be a lack of communication among the different groups of stakeholders 
according to the interviews.  Thus, the challenges facing the industry are perceived differently 
by each group.  The centralized government figures are detached from the farmers and VCO 
makers.  Furthermore, there is a fear to challenge authorities.  “Fiji is suffering from personality 
politics.  If you disagree with them, you are regarded as the enemy.  Everything becomes 
personal” (Private consultant, Suva).   
The interviews and stakeholder mapping generated a broad range of perspectives on the 
challenges to Fiji’s integration into the international coconut value chain.  
Identifying perceived challenges and opportunities 
For all farmers interviewed, coconut production is only one of several income sources.  Other 
farming activities include kava and taro, livestock keeping, and fishing.  Due to the high prices 
of kava and taro, much of the land and labor in Taveuni is now used for these two crops.  
Compared with coconuts, these crops do not require large areas of land and length of time until 
harvest, making them more attractive to cultivate.  Furthermore, unlike coconuts, there is no 
additional labor required after harvest to sell kava or taro.  “Right now, kava and taro are getting 
more money than copra, so no one wants to make copra” (Estate manager, Taveuni).  According 
to interviews with farmers and managers, there is currently no copra production in Taveuni after 
the destruction of Hurricane Winston in 2016.  Only one foreign farmer is investing in growing 
coconuts and investing in the value-added technologies needed for entering the international 
virgin coconut oil market.  His production is in the initial stages, and therefore, the outcome 
will not be observed for several more years.       
Table 3.4 presents an overview of the most often stated perceived challenges by each 
stakeholder category. The results show that respondents from the Ministry name mostly senile 
trees as the main challenge.  Conversely, farmers and researchers state a lack of diversified 
markets and low copra prices as their points of concern.  Because of diverging perceptions, 
parties also have different views to address the constraints.  Of all the farmers we interviewed, 
not one has participated in the government scheme of replanting either because they did not 
know about it or they did not receive any seedlings.  We also observed during field visits that 
piles of coconut seedlings are left on the side of the road, unused and germinated.   
 
 




Table 3.4: Perceived challenges by each stakeholder category 
Stakeholder Category Perceived Challenges Perceived Opportunities 
Ministry of Agriculture Senile trees Replanting 
International Knowledge, supply Global demand 
Private Lack of market Increasing awareness 
Farmer/VCO Processor Prices, transportation, market, 
competing crops 
VCO market; possible 
markets 
 
There are additional constraints stated by the respondents.  The government provides machines 
to local women’s groups in the form of the production of VCO.  However, one member of the 
women’s group remarked that their main obstacle is the lack of electricity. She commented that 
it is difficult to convince other members to cooperate together to make VCO due to the lack of 
electricity generators in the village (Women’s group member, Savusavu).  With no access to 
power, production is restricted. There are no functional farmer organizations that exist to 
coordinate production on a larger scale.  Farmers and women group members work in parallel 
with each other within the same village.  We did not observe any coordinated production among 
the villages.   
A university professor questioned the qualifications of extension officers. “They might be 
generalists in vegetables, but we need coconut experts.  The resources that have been diverted 
have not transformed into outcomes” (Academic, Suva).  
In the land tenure system, there is still a possibility to lease land to private investors.  However, 
much of this land, in particular, the plantations are leased to foreign investors who prioritize 
immediate profits. After Hurricane Winston struck in 2016, many coconut plantations remain 
damaged and unrestored.  “This place is owned by a Malaysian based in Hong Kong.  They 
don’t want to spend money to refurbish these estates.  Whatever money we get is only to 
develop the estates according to what they want to do…” (Estate manager, Taveuni).       
Recently, there have been efforts to promote the production of VCO, which is believed to be 
able to bring in a premium price.  However, governmental efforts go little beyond training local 
women’s groups to make VCO and other by-products.  There is no follow-up or coordination 
among the groups who attended the training.  VCO generates the highest price, however, the 
production is done on a very small scale and not widely promoted.  VCO producers also 
comment that they do not have enough supply of coconuts nor labor to have a larger production.  
One leader of the women’s group comments that if they had a larger production, then they could 
have their VCO tested for quality at the Koronovia research center located in Suva. 




The pricing of coconut oil, together with no knowledge of other value-added products is a major 
concern. “Farmers don’t know the end product of copra, only oil.  We don’t really know what 
they do with the copra and who they sell to… Right now, with the price, people are happy, but 
it would be better if the prices are higher.  The process is difficult with cutting and drying.  If 
the prices can go up, then we can’t complain much” (Farmer, Savusavu).   
When asked about whether there is awareness of products beyond copra and coconut oil, our 
interviews show that the majority of farmers and local government officials have no knowledge 
of coconut products other than copra and oil. Some mention coconut water for direct 
consumption locally, but knowledge of packaged coconut water for export is limited.     
Despite the constraints mentioned by the farmers, they all stated to have a positive outlook on 
the coconut industry.  Many farmers comment that coconut palms have been planted by their 
forefathers and have always been a part of their lives.  The domestic market is good if whole 
nuts, instead of dehusked nuts are sold. Farmers expressed willingness to sell whole nuts if they 
have access to transportation.  As already shown in table 2, selling whole nuts is more profitable 
than selling copra. Overall, there is a consensus to continue coconut harvest and copra 
production.  “Prices are increasing” (Farmer, Savusavu).  This could be a key factor, especially 
if and when prices of kava and taro start to decrease.   
Respondents from the government perceive replanting nuts for the future outlook.  If massive 
replanting efforts are undertaken, then a future supply of nuts would be secured. International 
researchers observe that the international market is growing, therefore the potential to produce 
the products is there.  
Members of the women’s groups do see a good future with producing VCO.  “Doing VCO is 
easier than extracting kernels to make copra.  It produces more income than copra.  Before, we 
used to make copra, but now, we are making VCO and soap out of VCO” (Women’s group 
member, Savusavu).  The link to tourism is a starting point of having increased production and 
quality testing.  Members of the women’s group already sell VCO to high-end resorts and 
tourists from cruise ships.  This is a market that has the potential to be expanded.  If there is a 
demand for exports, Fiji already has direct transportation linkages to major Pacific Rim markets 
that can be utilized.  Many comments that there are opportunities especially if private 
companies are involved.  If larger companies become involved, they could provide the 
backbone of the industry and also serve as alternatives to Copra Millers.   
3.6 Discussion 
Our empirical analysis shows that voice and accountability and especially government 
effectiveness increase coconut exports from Fiji where the effective size of the latter is much 




larger.  This highlights the government’s ability to enforce contracts and the ability to provide 
complementary services that are needed during international exchanges.  The rights and 
bargaining power of citizens also have a positive effect on coconut exports from Fiji.  On the 
other hand, control of corruption decreases exports.  This finding supports the “grease the wheel” 
reasoning discussed by Ben Ali and Mdhillat (2015) in which more corruption could ease 
bureaucratic procedures that arise during bilateral exchanges.  For example, bureaucrats often 
bribe officials at customs to avoid complicated bureaucratic procedures (Ben Ali & Mdhillat, 
2015).  Dreher and Gassenbner (2013) further contend that the effects of weak policies could 
be eased by corruption by stimulating economic activities.  Our interviews do not reveal the 
entry points for corruption to take place.  Given that there are no formal or bureaucratic 
procedures until the export of crude coconut oil stage in the supply chain, we speculate that it 
is in this later segment in the value chain that corruption could ease exporting procedures.  
These findings give us a glimpse into the big picture of the role of institutional quality.   To 
further scrutinize and understand the storylines to understand the perceived opportunities and 
challenges of Fiji’s global integration in its relation to the role of institutions, we discuss our 
results from our qualitative interviews. 
The coconut value chain in Fiji is simple and shorter compared to other larger producing 
countries, given that there are fewer market outlets.  This process is labor-intensive.  At the 
same time, the monetary returns have stayed consistently low. These reasons, together with the 
communal land tenure system, mean that farmers have little incentive to replant and to invest 
time and care for coconut groves.  In contrast to the Philippines, for example, farmers sell whole 
nuts to either the village agent or town trader.  From there the nuts are sold to different retailers 
and processors of various products (Pabuayon et al., 2009).  Different actors are involved at 
different stages of the value chain, thus, not all farmers need to dehusk and process coconuts 
into copra themselves.  This value chain has less labor involved for the farmers and more buyers 
and market outlets. Fijian farmers do not necessarily need to take part in the high-value 
processing in order to benefit.  As many farmers remarked, since making copra is highly labor-
intensive, it is possible that the opportunity to sell whole nuts could incentivize them to replant 
and manage coconut groves.  This would also ensure that copra quality is consistent as there 
would be fewer copra processors.  High-value and niche markets could also create demand for 
the buying of whole nuts from farmers and villagers.  In this case, Fiji could benefit from the 
involvement of the private sector to link the knowledge and capital that is necessary for the 
development of niche markets (Juswanto & Ali, 2014).     




Because each farmer essentially acts alone in the production of copra, it is difficult to achieve 
economies of scale since production is at an individual level.  The linkages to markets could be 
realized through organizational upgrading, where farmers self-organize at the production level 
to realize economies of scale (Abdulsamad, 2016).            
We observe in the results that the lack of two-way communications among key actors leads to 
a difference in perceptions of problems encountering Fiji’s coconut sector. This result shares 
findings of social network theories that state similar groups are more likely to share similar 
views (Prell et al., 2009).  At the same time, actors don’t necessarily communicate better in 
terms of complex information and tasks. The decision-makers in the Ministry as well as the 
international organizations that implement projects are detached from the people who are 
harvesting and processing coconuts. The strategies from the government have not worked due 
to a lack of understanding of why farmers do not replant.  While many government officials 
and international researchers perceive senile trees as a major threat, none of the farmers 
mentioned this factor.  Extension officers do not engage in information exchange actively with 
farmers to comprehend the viewpoint of farmers and women’s groups.  Our results echo 
research by Bijman et al. (2012) and Pouton et al. (2010) that integrating smallholders into 
agricultural value chains requires coordination of the network of actors involved.  The role of 
formal institutions must be realized.  International institutions involved with research can 
extend their communication to farmers and villagers as well as facilitating dialogues between 
the government and the producers.   
Similar to a study by Neilson and Shonk (2014) on coffee production in the Toraja region of 
Indonesia, Fijian farmers have little incentive to prioritize coconut production since it is only 
produced for complementary subsistence and efforts into managing coconuts are not obvious 
paths towards wealth in the future.  Returns to planting coconuts are not immediate; palms 
usually take up to five years before nuts can be harvested.  The environment created by the 
historical developments of Fiji’s coconut sector and the country’s land ownership system limit 
both the individual and institutions’ incentives to put in further development and innovations.  
Foreign investors want immediate returns, therefore, they have no interest in developing and 
managing existing coconut plantations.  Instead, their focus is planting kava and taro on these 
same plantations. It is possible that farmers do not realize that decreasing the productivity of 
the palms is becoming an issue as some respondents mention that coconut palms have always 
been there, as a part of their life.  The farmers must see the value themselves for replanting.       
The interviews reveal that farmers are dependent on the government mill as a market outlet.  
They also express the need for more market opportunities and higher prices.  Similar to the 




findings of Angelucci and Conforti (2010), small farmers from Caribbean and Pacific Island 
countries state a lack of established institutions to spread information on market opportunities 
and facilitating access to financial and supply services and inputs.  The same authors also find 
that small farmers in Fiji tend to be more concerned with price volatility.  If there exist a stable 
business climate and consistent price, farmers would be motivated to invest in production and 
quality standards (Ponte & Gibbon, 2005).  
Our results show that there is a lack of coordination and cooperation in both copra production 
and VCO production.  If farmers can self-organize on the primary production level via farmers 
groups or cooperatives, then they could consolidate the processing of copra.  Villages can work 
together, instead of in parallel to another.  This way, each farmer would not have to bear this 
burden on himself. With the set-up of small copra processing centers around villages, Copra 
Millers could send trucks to these centers and transport copra back to the mill, easing the 
transportation constraint on farmers.  Similarly, women’s groups can work together in 
combining their production on a larger scale.  This makes it more possible for the groups to 
have their end-products tested for quality standards at the research station located near the 
capital city of Suva. 
Food safety practices remain a major roadblock for the integration of many coconut products.  
For Fiji to develop a coconut industry with higher value addition, farmers and processing units 
need to meet international food safety standards, such as the Codex Alimentarius or the Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP).  In addition to food safety, standards, and 
certifications that address labor and environmental issues are often required for many coconut 
products, especially those in niche markets.  The knowledge must be spread and efforts 
implemented. Fiji currently does not have any type of standards that guarantee the quality of 
VCO.  Without safety standards and private standards and certifications, it is difficult for Fiji 
to compete with other bigger producing countries with an already established and more 
sophisticated industry.   
To set up larger-scale processing centers, there must be strategies to ensure that there is a 
consistent supply of good quality nuts and copra.  The Ministry is not wrong when addressing 
programs of declining production and aging trees.  Especially when coconut processing plants 
are set up, there must be a consistent supply. At the same time, there is hardly any motivation 
among producers to plant one million trees, as the ministry is targeting, when there is no market 
to sell those extra nuts. 





Studies to date suggest that small and remote countries have much to gain by integrating into 
the global value chain, such as increases in specialization, economies of scale, and income 
(Breisinger et al., 2019; Kowalski et al., 2015; Streeten, 1993).  We add to the literature by 
looking into a specific case study and exploring the opportunities and challenges to the Fijian 
coconut sector by using a mixed-methods approach.  We first assess Fiji’s coconut exports 
based on three of the World Bank’s world governance indicators.  We conduct field research in 
three regions of Fiji to interview different stakeholder groups in the coconut sector.  The goal 
is to assess the perceptions of each group.  We map out a communications network diagram 
that shows the relationships and forms of communication that actors in the value chain have 
with each other.  We then identify the perceived challenges and opportunities according to each 
stakeholder group.   
Our findings suggest the challenges that face Fiji’s integration into the global market are 
multifaceted.  On a macro-level, giving voice and rights to citizens and increased government 
effectiveness increase Fiji’s export of coconut products.  
The existing value chain is rudimentary and limited to low-value products such as copra and 
crude oil.  Though much of the crude oil is exported, it brings very little return to those who are 
involved in coconut production. The existing land tenure system further disincentives 
smallholders to invest time and energy in managing coconut groves and replanting. Access to 
high-end international markets remains restricted due to a lack of diversification and innovation 
in products.  The exchange between major stakeholder groups is fragmented.  The main 
decision-makers and international organizations that fund coconut development projects do not 
directly communicate with people who are involved with the collection and production of 
coconuts.  Each group perceives that challenges facing the industry very different and this 
creates different incentives in where each stakeholder is willing to put forth efforts. 
The situation in Fiji is not dissimilar than those in neighboring island nations.  Fiji is in a more 
advantageous situation as it already has established markets in developed nations such as 
Australia and New Zealand.  It might seem obvious to assume that one of the main reasons why 
Fiji, along with other Pacific Island nations, cannot integrate into the global coconut value chain 
is due to its natural geographic situation.  However, one of the most successful non-alcoholic 
drinks in the world, Fiji Water, was able to break through this barrier to enter the competitive 
international market.  Due to the isolation of Fiji’s location and its association with being a 
tropical paradise, the water brand has defied constraints such as high transportation costs.  The 
rising popularity of Fiji water shows an emerging preference towards distinctive taste and 




quality associated with a geographical region (Connell, 2006).  This demonstrates that 
remoteness and small economies might be constraints, however, with the right innovation and 
investment climate, there is a possibility for industries to enter the world market. This same 
idea could be applied to coconut products from Fiji.  The small size of Fiji and its isolation to 
the rest of the world is not enough to justify why the sector has not thrived on a global scale. 
The findings of this study could be of benefit to many of the Pacific Island countries.  Coconut 
is a crop that needs to go through multiple stages of transformation before it can be utilized or 
consumed.  Items cannot be produced without the know-how and institutional support along 
the value chain.  There need to be mechanisms in place to create a conducive environment to 
diversify products that can come out of nuts. In order for the coconut industry to benefit from 
the current coconut market boom, Fiji needs efforts and support from several sectors.  The 
islands are naturally endowed with coconut palms and smallholders have generations’ worth of 
knowledge in cultivation and copra production.  At the same time, an understanding of each 
party in the value chain and an effort to work together is crucial for the industry to enter the 
global market.  The demand for traditional and niche coconut products is well established.  By 
having the appropriate institutional support and facilitation in place, there is potential for 


























4 Modern agricultural value chains and food security of urban 
consumers in developing countries 
 
The efficiency of these farms versus large commercial farms relative to large commercial farms 
has been the subject of considerable research. Yet, no study has looked at the links between 
domestic agricultural commercialization and food security. This research fills the gap in the 
literature by assessing the effects of a transition of rural smallholder farming to selling or 
renting landholdings and supplying labor to larger commercial farms on the food security and 
economic welfare of in-country urban consumers. We model the ability of commercialized 
domestic agriculture to lower the price of traditional staple crops. We take price elasticities of 
demand for staple commodities from 15 studies conducted in several low-income countries and 
embed a demand-side framework into the Ma-Sexton model to study the impacts of land 
consolidation and the onset of commercial farming systems on the dietary diversity and 
economic welfare of both smallholder farmers and urban consumers. 
 
Keywords: Staple crops, food demand, urban consumers, land and labor institutions, 
modern agricultural markets, smallholder farms 
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In most developing countries, small-scale family farming systems remain the pillar of the 
agricultural economy. In the last several decades, the average farm size in most developing 
countries has decreased (Adamopoulos & Restuccia, 2014; Hazell et al., 2010; Lowder et al., 
2016; Riggs et al., 2016). The efficiency of these farms, mostly under two hectares, relative to 
large commercial farms, has been the subject of considerable research and debate.  Findings by 
Barrett et al. (2010) show that compared to larger-scale farms, smallholder farmers do achieve 
the inverse product-size relationship.  However, others argue that much of this relationship 
could be attributed to estimations that differ qualitatively, the erroneous definition of 
productivity (Sanchez et al., 2019), and biased by limitations due to information asymmetry 
(Carter & Zimmerman, 2000; Zimmerman & Carter, 2003). 
Smallholder farming has received much institutional support due to some evidence that 
highlights the importance of smallholder farms if agriculture is to play a role in development 
and poverty reduction (Birner & Resnick, 2010; Diao et al., 2007). Part of India’s initiatives to 
double farmer’s income by 2022 (Srikala, 2020) further emphasizes the imperative shared by 
governments and international organizations. These strategies aim more towards sustaining 
small farmers rather than enabling them to transition out of farming and into supplying inputs 
to commercial operations.   
The commercialization and consolidation of farms affect smallholders.  Recent studies have 
shown that the food security status of farm households have increased from participation in 
modern agricultural supply chains (Bellemare & Novak, 2017; Montalbano et al., 2018).  
However, much of this current research has focused on high-value export products.  The 
implications of these studies are important, however, there has been little attention paid to their 
effects via staple food markets for in-country urban consumers.  Carbohydrates in the form of 
cereals and tubers remain the primary staples for many developing countries. Upgrading staple 
commodity chains could alleviate poverty and food insecurity more than the development of 
high-value commodity chains (Diao et al., 2012).  For example, Maertens and Vande Velde 
(2017) find that contract farming in the rice sector in Benin leads to an increase in income and 
higher productivity benefits for farmers. Experimental studies by Demont and Ndour (2015) in 
African markets show that upgrades in the rice value chain increase the opportunities for rural 
farmers to connect with urban markets. We contribute to the literature by shifting the focus to 
the links between agricultural commercialization and the dietary diversity of domestic urban 
inhabitants.  We do so by building on a model developed by Ma and Sexton (forthcoming).  




Their framework modeled a hypothetical setting in which supportive institutions enabled 
smallholder farmers to terminate farm operations to supply land and labor inputs to larger 
commercialized farms. The model allowed for the labor efficiency advantage of small farms, 
but incorporated capital constraints and disadvantages in the output market. Household incomes 
and total production output were compared to a setting in which farms continued under 
smallholder production. Their findings show that even accounting for labor efficiency on 
smallholder farms, supplying inputs and labor to large commercial farms leads to higher 
incomes and larger production outputs compared with working on own small farms across a 
wide range of plausible market settings.  
This paper addresses the model’s unanswered questions of how this productivity effect can 
influence the welfare of domestic consumers if the increased output is directed towards staple 
commodities sold in the home country markets in the following dimensions. We model the 
ability of commercialized domestic agriculture to substantially lower the price of traditional 
staple commodities. Not only can this increase the consumption of the staple, but it can also 
generate a substantial income effect given the importance of the staple in poor consumers’ 
budgets. 
The organization of this paper is as follows: the next section reviews the literature regarding 
the relative efficiencies of small-scale and commercial farming in developing countries and the 
relationship between agricultural production and food security. Section 3 introduces the 
conceptual model of smallholder transformation and domestic food markets.  In section 4, the 
model is parameterized based on the empirical literature on price elasticities of demand. Section 
5 presents the simulation results, and section 6 concludes with a discussion on the policy 
implications.   
 
4.2 Background 
Relative efficiencies of small-scale and commercial agriculture in low-income countries 
The inverse relationship between productivity and farm size has been widely studied in 
developing countries. The literature thus far has conflicting views on this relationship. 
Explanations that support this hypothesis center around the relative inefficiency of hired labor 
(Feder, 1985) and imperfect markets (Barrett et al., 2010; Heltberg, 1998). The opposite 
viewpoints contend that commercial farms receive higher prices than smallholder farms.  
Reasons could be several: (i) better access to information for commercial farms (Courtois & 
Subervie, 2015), (ii) smallholders are more exposed to the buyer market power due to limited 




selling opportunities (Mitra et al., 2018), and (iii) receive discounted prices due to limited sales 
volumes (Poulton et al., 2010). 
Smallholders are also often credit constrained, thus limiting their ability to obtain market inputs 
(Sial & Carter, 1996). Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) find that productivity levels of credit-
constrained households are related to their land and liquidity endowments. Their study in 
Northern Peru finds that the value of output per hectare increased by 26 percent when credit 
constraints were removed in the formal sector (Guirkinger & Boucher, 2008).  
Ma and Sexton (forthcoming) build a model of a rural economy that attempts to quantify these 
factors and compare rural household income under smallholder framing with a hypothetical 
scenario in which farms are able to consolidate and rural households supply land and labor 
inputs to the commercial farms. The model accounts for the labor-efficiency advantage of 
smallholder farms to commercial farms, and also smallholders’ disadvantages in terms of 
selling prices and access to market inputs. The less the loss of labor efficiency by large farms 
and the more constricted the smallholder’s credit constraints, the larger is the income advantage 
from supplying labor and land to commercial farms compared to operating on small farms (Ma 
& Sexton, forthcoming).  
The Ma-Sexton model is limited in that it assumes output price is not a function of output 
quantity in the local economy, thereby making their model applicable mainly to export 
commodities, wherein the local economy represents a “small country” price-taking exporter.  
Their paper, thus, leaves unaddressed the essential question of how productivity improvements 
for important non-tradeable staple crops might improve the welfare of not only the rural 
producing households but also of urban consumers.  This paper studies this question. The Ma-
Sexton model is extended to incorporate that output price is affected by the domestic supply, 
i.e., demand for the staple is downward sloping with an elasticity that is parameterized from the 
empirical literature and that varies across commodities and country settings.  
Agricultural production and food security 
Food demand differs according to income levels. Engel’s law states a family’s budget share of 
food decreases as its income rises. As household income grows, an increase of a lesser 
proportion in the household’s budget would be allocated to food expenditure. Though higher 
income is often associated with an increase in consumption of high-value foods, we know very 
little about the changes in consumption for staple commodities, such as cereals (Mottaleb et al., 
2018), especially in urban households. 




Around 97 percent of urban citizens are net food buyers (FAO, 2008), who rely largely on 
household income for food consumption (Ruel et al., 2010).  In low-income countries, around 
half of available calories come from cereals, meaning that a decrease in cereal prices would 
have a big effect on people’s diet relative to a price decrease in other food groups (Cornelsen 
et al., 2015). Though some literature suggests that in many developing countries, urban 
consumers are substituting consumption of staples towards animal proteins, dairy, fruits, and 
vegetables (Muhammad et al., 201l; Minten et al., 2017), it is difficult to distinguish whether 
the changing food consumption pattern is due to rising incomes or urbanization.  
Poor households tend to prioritize food that is denser in calories over the quality of food (Tefft 
et al., 2017) thus spending a considerable share of their income on staple foods (Mason et al., 
2011). For example, in Zambia, though there is a trend towards changing diets, the share of 
staple crops remain high for those living in poverty (Mason & Jayne, 2009). In Niger, the lowest 
income quintile spends around 60 percent of its food budget on staples, compared to 44 percent 
for the highest-income quintile (Hollinger and Staatz, 2015). Furthermore, Alem and 
Soederbom (2018) find that urban Ethiopian households continue to consume teff, a local staple 
crop, as a main source of carbohydrate in their diet even when the price of teff has increased. 
In India, price elasticities are lower for richer households compared to poorer households 
(Kumar et al., 2011). These studies imply that the majority of the urban poor continue to devote 
a large share of their expenditure to staple food, thus, they become vulnerable when there is an 
increase in food prices (Ivanic & Martin, 2008). Additionally, if, as these studies suggest, a 
price hike in staple food acts as a fall in income for urban inhabitants, then equally, a significant 
decrease in prices of staple goods would increase the purchasing power for the same group of 
people.  
The consumer’s response to price changes in a staple food is based on their relation to the prices 
of other items he or she purchases, and the consumer’s budget or income (Dorward, 2012).  A 
change in the price of food can either drive consumers to substitute within the same food group 
or to a different category of food (Skoufias et al., 2011).        
First, via the income effect, a price decrease serves as an implicit increase in real income, 
enabling consumers to spend this extra “income” on other foods.  For instance, in the Sahelian 
region of Africa, as net buyers of millet and sorghum, urban households suffer a fall in real 
income when price increases in these staples (Haggblade et al., 2017). If the staple has a low-
income elasticity compared to other food groups, then the income effect is small for the staple 
but larger for other food groups, such as fruits, vegetables, and animal proteins, which have 
greater income elasticities. In Kenya, food security and diet quality are improved through higher 




incomes gained through commercialization (Ogutu et al., 2019). In response to higher prices in 
starchy staples, consumers in West Africa respond by cutting back on diet quality, reducing 
consumption of fruits, vegetables, and animal protein (Hollinger and Staatz, 2015). Colen et al. 
(2018) find large differences in income elasticities among food groups in Africa with higher 
elasticities for animal protein and dairy compared to other food groups. When food expenditure 
increases, poorer households substitute their staple intake towards higher-quality foods 
(Skoufias et al., 2011).  
Second, via the substitution effect, buyers will increase their consumption of the staple as its 
price is now relatively cheaper than other foods.  For example, research by Skoufias et al. (2011) 
in Mexico reveals that given an increase in per capita expenditure, a large share of poor 
households substitutes within cereal groups. In Malawi, increasing incomes is associated with 
higher demands for staples (Ecker & Qaim, 2011). Jensen and Miller (2008) find evidence of 
Giffen behavior in the Hunan province of China, where an increase in unearned income leads 
to a decrease in rice consumption. This negative income elasticity for the staple means that all 
of the income effect created by the price reduction goes to diversifying the diet. 
Table 4.1 shows the price elasticities of the staple food group from the literature. Price 
elasticities of demand from the literature indicate that an increase in price is negatively related 
to consumption. These numbers suggest that if prices were to decrease for staples, then 
consumption of the staple item would thus increase.   
Table 4.1: Price elasticities of demand for staple crops in selected studies 
 
Authors Year Country Price elasticities  
Abdulai & Aubert 2004 Tanzania -1.03 
Ackah & Appleton 2007 Ghana -1.1 
Agbola 2003 South Africa -1.73 
Akinleye & Rahji 2007 Nigeria -0.85 
Alfonzo & Peterson 2006 Paraguay -0.88 
Balisacan 1994 Philippines -0.93 
Ecker & Qaim 2011 Malawi -0.80 
Jensen & Manrique 1998 Indonesia -0.62 
Kumar et al. 2011 India -0.64 
Menezes et al. 2008 Brazil -0.92 
Me-Nsope & Staatz 2016 Mali -1.02 
Nirmali & Edirisinghe 2015 Sri Lanka -0.71 
Ulimwengu et al. 2009 Ethiopia -0.84 
Ulimwengu & Ramadan 2009 Uganda -0.41 
Ulimwengu et al. 2012 Dem. Rep. of Congo -2.07 




In addition, income and expenditure elasticities are lower in these countries relative to other 
food groups as shown in table 4.2, suggesting that as income increases, consumers spend 
relatively less on staples and more on animal protein and dairy products (Abdulai et al., 1999). 
In urban India, cereals and pulses have an expenditure elasticity of 0.48 compared to 1.14 for 
meat, fish and eggs, and 1.40 for milk products(Abdulai et al., 1999). Similarly, in Tanzania 
and Malawi, expenditure elasticities of meat, fish, eggs, and dairy products are higher than one 
whereas cereals and pulses have elasticities of less than one (Abdulai & Aubert, 2004; Ecker & 
Qaim, 2011).   
Table 4.2: Budget shares for staples and income/expenditure elasticities of staples vs. 
animal proteins in urban areas from selected studies 
 
These numbers suggest that traditional carbohydrate staples in these countries have a high 
budget shares but low-income elasticities to the point that the benefit from the higher real 
incomes generated by lower staple prices can contribute to expanding the consumption of other 
foods that could enhance dietary diversity and nutritional health of the poor urban households.   
 
4.3 Conceptual Model 
We consider a closed developing economy that contains an agricultural sector and a nonfarm 
sector. In the baseline equilibrium, its agricultural sector relies on a smallholder production 
system, employing all rural labor, and supplies the staple food for the entire economy. The 
nonfarm sector produces nonfarm products for all. In an alternative scenario, large-scale 
                                                          
7 Animal protein refers to Meat, fish, eggs, and dairy products 















1999 India 0.19 0.48 1.27 0.89 
Abdulai & 
Aubert 
2004 Tanzania 0.40 0.74 1.23 1.04 
Ecker & 
Qaim 
2011 Malawi 0.37 0.8 1.27 0.31 
Ulimwengu 
et al. 






0.22 0.06 1.31 0.91 




commercial farms emerge and produce staple food using land and labor provided by 
smallholder households. Our goal is to set up a conceptual model of smallholder and large-scale 
production with an endogenous price for the staple food and endogenously determined prices 
for farmland and farm labor.  
In the baseline equilibrium, there are ?̅? households in the economy out of which 𝑁 = ?̅?𝜙 are 
homogeneous “rural” households and ?̅?(1 − 𝜙) are homogeneous “urban” households. We 
assume that rural and urban markets for farm and nonfarm goods are integrated. Specifically, 
consumer demand for staple food is 𝑝𝑟 = 𝐷(𝑄|𝑌) = 𝑎𝑄𝑏  where 𝑎 > 0  and 𝑏 < 0 . The 
demand elasticity is a constant of 
1
𝑏
.  Let the demand for nonfarm good be elastic with a market 
price normalized to one.  
Under smallholder production, the urban and rural prices of the staple food differ by a fixed 
percentage of marketing margin reflecting intermediaries’ costs of processing and transporting 
the product. Thus, the price faced by smallholders can be expressed as 𝑎𝜎𝑆𝑄
𝑏 where 𝜎𝑆 < 1. 
Under large-farm production, a different fixed percentage of marketing margin applies. The 
price paid by rural households is 𝑎𝜎𝐿𝑄
𝑏 where 𝜎𝑆 < 𝜎𝐿 < 1. For simplicity, normalize 𝑎𝜎𝐿 =
?̅?, and let 
𝜎𝑆
𝜎𝐿
 be 𝜎 < 1. The rural price under smallholder production can be expressed as 𝜎?̅?𝑄𝑏 
whereas under large-farm production is expressed as ?̅?𝑄𝑏. 
Smallholder Production 
We consider a typical agricultural household model (Singh et al. 1986), where a rural household 
maximizes utility from consuming a composite nonfarm good (x), the staple food (z), and leisure 
(l) under an endogenous budget equal to the net sales of farm outputs. The utility function is 
concave in the three goods and has first derivatives going to infinity if the value of consumption 
is zero. We treat the composite nonfarm commodity price as a constant and normalized to 1.0. 
Farm production is increasing in the use of land (h), labor (t), and “capital inputs” (k). Capital 
inputs may, depending on the farm product, include seeds, fertilizers, herbicides, and equipment, 
i.e., they are inputs that have to be purchased through the market and prior to the harvest and 
the realization of farm income. Without loss of generality, we normalize the land and labor 
endowments of homogenous rural households to 1.0.  
In the equilibrium, no land or labor is traded even with perfect factor markets due to the 
symmetry among rural households. The market price for capital inputs is 𝑣, and we allow for 
an imperfect credit market. Each household is hence constrained in using capital inputs by an 




exogenous budget constraint, 𝐵, which may reflect savings carried forward to the crop year 
and/or the available credit. 
The smallholder problem is specified as follows: 
max
𝑥,𝑧,𝑙,𝑘






𝑓(ℎ𝑆, 𝑡𝑆, 𝑘𝑆) − 𝑣𝑘𝑆                    (𝜇) 
𝑣𝑘𝑆 ≤ 𝐵                    (Γ) 
𝑙𝑆 + 𝑡𝑆 ≤ 1 
Choice variables 𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑙, 𝑘 are all nonnegative. To obtain analytical solutions, we specify the 
utility function as 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑙) = 𝑥1/3𝑧1/3𝑙1/3 . Utilizing a Cobb-Douglas utility function with 
equal exponents and budget shares for its arguments greatly simplifies the exposition, but, of 
course, involves a loss in generality. We later relax this assumption and consider the 
implications for the analysis of heterogeneous budget shares.  
Let the farm production function also be in the Cobb-Douglas form: 𝑞𝑆 = 𝑓(ℎ, 𝑡, 𝑘) = ℎ
𝛼𝑡𝛽𝑘𝜀, 
where 𝛼, 𝛽,  𝜖 (0,1) are the output elasticities for land, labor, and capital inputs, respectively.  
In addition, we follow the convention (e.g., Feder 1985; Eswaran and Kotwal 1986; Barrett et 
al. 2010) and assume constant returns to scale (CRS) in farm production, so that 𝛼 + 𝛽 + =
1.  
In the equilibrium, the constraint on labor endowment is binding by the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, 
so that 𝑡𝑆
∗ = 1 − 𝑙𝑆
∗, where superscript * indicates equilibrium values throughout the article. 
Given that 𝛼 > 0, it will always be optimal for the household to fully utilize its land allocation, 
so ℎ𝑆
∗ = 1.  
Denote the Lagrangian function as ℒ . The FOC for each choice variable implies that its 
marginal contribution to utility equals its marginal market value with 𝑢𝑖  representing the 
derivative of the utility function with respect to variable i:  
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑥𝑆
= 𝑢𝑥 − 𝜇 = 0,      (1) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑧𝑆
= 𝑢𝑧 − 𝜇𝑝𝑆
𝑓
= 0,     (2) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑙𝑆
= 𝑢𝑙 − 𝜇 (𝑝𝑆
𝑓 𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑡𝑆






− 𝑣) − Γ𝑣 = 0.      (4) 




From (2) we have 𝜇 =
𝑢𝑧
𝑝𝑆
𝑓 > 0, implying that the overall budget constraint is also binding. We 




) − 𝜇 (1 +
Γ
𝜇




) = (1 +
Γ
𝜇
) 𝑣.       (4′) 
We focus on the case when the credit constraint is binding for smallholders, so Γ > 0. From (4′) 
the marginal return to capital inputs for the credit-constrained farmer is, thus, larger than the 
market price, 𝑣. We define 𝛾 = 1 +
Γ
𝜇
> 1, so that the marginal return to capital inputs at the 
constrained optimum is 𝛾𝑣 > 𝑣. 
Thus, the parameter 𝛾  measures the magnitude of the credit constraint facing smallholder 
farmers, where the larger is 𝛾, the less efficient is the allocation of capital inputs on smallholder 
farms. An alternative but conceptually equivalent interpretation emerges for settings where 
smallholders are unable to access formal lending institutions and instead receive credit at a 
higher rate from an informal lending sector. Define 𝜈 as the interest rate offered through the 




Dividing (2) by (1), we find that 𝑥𝑆 = 𝑝𝑆
𝑓
𝑧𝑆, reflecting the equal-budget-shares property of the 





𝜀 − 𝑣𝑘𝑆.       (5) 
Dividing (3) by (2), we express consumption of the staple food as a function of leisure: 
𝑧𝑆 = 𝑙𝑆𝛽(1 − 𝑙𝑆)
𝛽−1𝑘𝑆
𝜀 .        (6) 







).        (7) 











𝛽 .        (8) 
Equating equations (7) and (8), we find that the optimal amount of leisure, 𝑙𝑆
∗  depends on 





∗ = 1 −
2𝛽
1 − /𝛾 + 2𝛽
. 
It follows that the optimal amount of labor input into farming is 





∗ = 1 − 𝑙𝑆
∗ =
2𝛽





Labor input is increasing in its own output elasticity and decreasing in the inefficiency of credit 
markets (i.e., higher 𝛾 ), with that effect scaled by capital’s output elasticity, .  
To determine the optimal use of capital inputs, we first find the equilibrium consumption of 
staple food by urban households, 𝑄𝑆




∗)𝛽, minus the rural consumption, which is found by substituting 𝑙𝑆









Given the inverse urban demand function, 𝑝𝑆
𝑓
= 𝜎?̅?(𝑄𝑆
𝑈)𝑏, the farm price of staple food in the 


















∗)𝛽, we derive 𝑘𝑆
∗. 
The expression of 𝑘𝑆
∗  is markedly simplified by setting 𝑏 = −1  (unit demand elasticity). 8 







∗ is increasing in capital’s output elasticity, urban consumer demand, and the small-farm share 
of retail value and is decreasing in 𝛾.  
Finally, we substitute equilibrium values for 𝑘𝑆  and 𝑙𝑆  into (6) to obtain the equilibrium 
smallholder consumption of staple food. Equilibrium consumption of the composite commodity 


















?̅?𝜎(1 − /𝛾) 
(1 + /𝛾)𝑁 
. 







                                                          
8 This assumption is quite common in modeling (e.g., Costinot et al. 2016) and is a characteristic of log utility 
models, but of course, involves loss of generality. However, the literature on demands for staple foods in low 
income countries has an average elasticity from the surveyed papers being  𝜖?̅? = −0.88. The demand elasticity 
for the staple for smallholders is also -1.0, given the Cobb-Douglas utility function, creating a symmetry between 
the urban and rural demands.  
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Large Farm Problem 
We now consider an alternative scenario where smallholder farms are replaced through market 
processes by M relatively large-scale farms. Assume that the large farms are homogeneous and 
sufficiently numerous so that they do not exercise buyer power in factor markets or the output 
market. Restrictions on the size to ensure competitive factor markets could be achieved through 
government policies. Taking market prices as given, each large farm chooses the optimal 
amounts of land, labor, and capital inputs to put into production. Land and labor inputs are 
provided to the large farms by smallholder households, and the competitive prices for these 
inputs are determined endogenously within the local economy. Rural households no longer self-
supply the staple and purchase it at retail according to the demand derived from their utility 
maximization problem. The price of capital inputs is 𝜈 and exogenous to the farms. We assume 
that one defining characteristic of a large farm is that it has capital reserves or access to formal 
capital markets and does not face a credit constraint. 
We assume that the production function of large farms has the same structure as the smallholder 
production function. This assumption simplifies modeling, but, more importantly, it enables the 
model to focus on economic instead of technological differences between smallholder and large 
farms in terms of (i) staple-food price received, (ii) labor efficiency, and (iii) credit access.9 We 
later relax this assumption and allow the large-farm technology to be more capital intensive and 
less labor-intensive and study the impacts of conversion to commercial farms on rural 
employment under this condition. 





𝑓(ℎ𝐿 , 𝑡𝐿 , 𝑘𝐿) − 𝑟ℎ𝐿 − 𝑤𝑡𝐿 − 𝑣𝑘𝐿 . 
We allow for a loss in labor efficiency on large farms due to the widely discussed and debated 
principal-agent problem with hired farm labor in low-income country settings (Feder 1985; 
Barrett et al. 2010; Sanchez et al. 2019). Specifically, the effective input of labor is 𝜔 ≤ 1 for 
each unit of labor hired on a large farm. Thus, 𝑓(ℎ𝐿 , 𝑡𝐿 , 𝑘𝐿) = ℎ𝐿
𝛼(𝜔𝑡𝐿)
𝛽𝑘𝐿
𝜀. We define Ω =
                                                          
9 Another way to capture the differences in technological efficiency is to add multipliers to the production 
functions, but such differences have the same effect as the differences between 𝜎𝐿 and 𝜎𝑆. 




𝜔𝛽 , where 𝜔 is scaled by the importance of labor as a production input to capture the overall 
labor efficiency disadvantage of the large farm. 





∗ = 𝑛(1 − 𝑙𝐿
∗) where 𝑙𝐿
∗  is the 
optimal amount of leisure of each smallholder household in the large-farm equilibrium, found 
by solving its utility-maximization problem, taking the market equilibrium wage rate, market 
land rental rate, and staple-food output price as given. 
The utility-maximization problem of rural households is: 
max
𝑥,𝑧,𝑙
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑙) 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑥𝐿 + 𝑝𝐿
𝑟∗𝑧𝐿 + 𝑤
∗𝑙𝐿 ≤ 𝑟
∗ + 𝑤∗ 
With no missing market from the smallholder’s perspective, the model is recursive. To solve 
this utility-maximizing problem, we first rewrite the budget of a smallholder household as a 
function of market equilibrium prices for land and labor. With competitive factor markets, these 

















∗)𝜀.       (10) 
Given equal budget shares, optimal consumptions of the three goods are: 
𝑥𝐿


















.      (12) 
Substituting (9) and (10) into (12) and solving yields the optimal consumption of leisure: 
𝑙𝐿
∗ = 1 −
2𝛽







∗, meaning that rural households supply more labor in the large-farm equilibrium. 




1 − + 2𝛽
) 𝑛. 
To simplify notation, denote 𝜆 =
2𝛽
1−𝜀+2𝛽
 and 𝜆𝛽 = Λ. Given these equilibrium values for land 






𝜀) − 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑤(𝜆𝑛) − 𝑣𝑘𝐿 . 




The FOC of capital inputs implies that 
𝑘𝐿





















Staple food consumed by urban households is the total production less the amount 𝑧𝐿
∗𝑁 
consumed by rural households: 𝑄𝑈 =
2−𝜎𝐿(1−𝜀)
2
𝑄𝐿. Given the demand of urban households and 
with 𝑏 = −1, the retail price paid by both urban and rural households is 𝑝𝑟 =
?̅?
𝜎𝐿
(𝑄𝑈)−1 .  
Following a similar procedure to solving the smallholder problem, it then becomes 



































𝜎𝐿[2 − 𝜎𝐿(1 − )]
(ΛΩ)−1 (
2?̅?





The comparison of goods consumed by rural and urban households in the two equilibria is 
presented in Appendix A. Our key consideration is the welfare for rural and urban households 
under the two scenarios. To make the comparison, we need to quantity the welfare changes for 
urban and rural households. For urban households, we derive the equivalent variation (𝐸𝑉𝑈) as 
the monetary value to an urban household of a price change for the staple food due to the change 
in the structure of the farm economy. Their incomes and prices of other goods stay unchanged. 
Let 𝑒(𝑝, 𝑢) be the representative urban consumer’s expenditure function, and let superscripts 0 
and 1 indicate the small- and large-farm equilibria, respectively. Then 
𝐸𝑉𝑈 = 𝑒(𝑝0, 𝑢1) − 𝑒(𝑝1, 𝑢1). 
If 𝑝1 < 𝑝0, then 𝐸𝑉𝑈 > 0 indicates that the monetary value of the price decrease to an urban 
household. Denote the price change of the staple as Δ𝑝 = 𝑝0 − 𝑝1. Then expanding 𝑒(𝑝1, 𝑢1) 




around the initial price and utility combination using a second-order Taylor’s series 
approximation (Mas-Colell et al. 1995), we obtain:  








(Δ𝑝)2 + 𝛿, 
















where, via Shephard’s Lemma, 𝑧ℎ(∙) is the Hicksian demand for the staple food evaluated at 
the large-farm equilibrium. We can replace the unobserved Hicksian demand, 𝑧ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑢1), with 
the observed Marshallian demand, 𝑧𝑚(𝑝1, 𝑌), where 𝑌 = 𝑒(𝑝1, 𝑢1) denotes the consumer’s 
money income because the two demand curves intersect at (𝑝1, 𝑢1).  
We use the Slutsky equation to replace the unobservable 
𝜕𝑧ℎ(𝑝1,𝑢1)
𝜕𝑝










, and rewrite this expression in its elasticity form 
to yield: 
𝐸𝑉𝑈 = 𝑧𝑚(𝑝1, 𝑌)𝑝1 (
Δ𝑝
𝑝1






)],     (13) 
where 𝜖𝑝 and 𝜖𝑌 are, respectively, the price and income elasticities of the Marshallian demand 
function, and 𝜉 is the expenditure share of the staple food, which is constant in this model. In 
our model, 𝜖𝑝 = 1/𝑏 = −1. The Marshallian demand for all urban households under the new 
price is 𝑍𝑚(𝑝1, 𝑌) = 𝑄𝐿
𝑢∗, 𝑝1 = 𝑝𝐿
𝑟∗, and 𝑝0 = 𝑝𝑆
𝑟∗. We can substitute these expressions into 



















(Ω𝜓 − 1) [1 + (
−1 + 𝜖𝑌𝜉
2
) (Ω𝜓 − 1)]      (14) 
as the measure of welfare change to an urban consumer in the large-farm equilibrium relative 
to the small-farm equilibrium. 
Because rural households are both consumers and producers, their welfare change cannot be 
computed based on the standard EV. Instead, we derive the income transfer (Δ𝑦𝑅) that would 
allow a rural household to achieve the maximized utility under the large-farm equilibrium, 𝑢𝐿
∗ , 
given the prices of consumed goods in the smallholder equilibrium.  
Δ𝑦𝑅 is conceptually similar to EV, but, unlike EV, we need to fix the consumption of leisure at 
𝑙𝑆
∗ to keep the staple-food price, 𝑝𝑆
𝑓∗
, and the shadow wage rate in the smallholder equilibrium 




unchanged, given the income transfer. If 𝑢𝐿
∗  > 𝑢𝑆
∗, Δ𝑦𝑅 > 0, i.e., a positive income transfer is 
needed, and if 𝑢𝐿
∗  < 𝑢𝑆
∗,  Δ𝑦𝑅 < 0. 
From FOCs (1) and (2), we know that the total expenditure on staple food and the nonfarm 
good equalize in equilibrium. Denote the new consumption levels of x and z required to achieve 
𝑢𝐿
∗  as 𝑥𝑆
′  and 𝑧𝑆
′  given prices in the smallholder equilibrium. These values are found by solving 

















































. Although Δ𝑌𝑅  is cumbersome to express analytically, it 
can be easily computed numerically. Worth noticing, the number of rural households, N, is not 
in the final expression of Δ𝑌𝑅.  
Finally, we can compute the total welfare change in the economy by attaching equal weights to 
the welfare of urban and rural households and, thus, summing 𝐸𝑉𝑈 and Δ𝑌𝑅. In the following 
section, we quantify the welfare changes under reasonable values for the model parameters 
based on the empirical literature. 
4.4 Simulation Results 
We develop plausible ranges for 𝜎, Ω, and 𝛾 values based on a survey of the empirical literature 
as summarized in Ma and Sexton (forthcoming) where 19 papers studying rice farming in 
developing countries in Asia and Africa are selected. The ranges of parameters are summarized 









Table 4.3 Simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 









Staple Food Production 
First, we compare total production and urban consumption of staple food under the two 






















we draw a hyperplane in a space with Ω, 𝜎, and 𝛾 being the three dimensions.  Any combination 
of ( Ω, 𝜎, 𝛾 ) above the hyperplane result in 𝑅𝑄 < 1  and 𝑅𝑄𝑈 < 1 , meaning that the 
corresponding quantity is higher under large-farm production.  
As shown in the figure, only when Ω and 𝛾  are sufficiently small and 𝜎  sufficiently large, 
would 𝑅𝑄 > 1 and 𝑅𝑄𝑈 > 1. Given that the literature suggests that 𝛾 is most likely to be larger 
than 2, 𝑅𝑄 is most likely to be smaller than 1.  
 
Figure 4.1 Production and Urban Consumption of the Staple Food 
Notes: Authors’ calculation. The yellow hyperplane represents 𝑅𝑄 = 1, while the red hyperplane represents 𝑅𝑄𝑈 =
1. The gray plane contains all points with 𝛾 = 1. 
 




Staple Food Price 
Comparing the rural and urban prices for staple food under two production modes, all 
combinations of (Ω, 𝜎, 𝛾) beneath the red hyperplane in figure 4.1 imply 𝑅𝑝𝑓 < 1, and all 
(Ω, 𝜎, 𝛾) beneath the yellow hyperplane in figure 4.2 imply 𝑅𝑝𝑟 < 1.  
It turns out that the two ratios tend to have opposite relative magnitudes against 1. Combinations 
of (Ω, 𝜎, 𝛾) below the red hyperplane and above the yellow hyperplane imply 𝑅𝑝𝑓 < 1 and 
𝑅𝑝𝑟 > 1 . Combinations of (Ω, 𝜎, 𝛾 ) above both hyperplanes imply 𝑅𝑝𝑓 > 1  and 𝑅𝑝𝑟 > 1 , 
meaning that both rural and urban households pay low prices for staple food under large-farm 
production.  
 
Figure 4.2 Rural and Urban Prices of the Staple Food 
Notes: Authors’ calculation. The red hyperplane represents 𝑅𝑝𝑓 = 1, while the yellow 𝑅𝑝𝑟 = 1. The gray plane 
contains all points with 𝛾 = 1. 
 
Equivalent Variation of Urban Households 
Since we only observe the expenditure share under the initial price (i.e., under smallholder 
production), we can express 𝑆1 using 𝑆0. The expression of relative EV becomes 
𝐸?̃? = 𝑆0 (
1 +
1 + /𝛾







) (Ω𝜓 − 1)] 
Letting 𝜖𝑌
1 = 𝜖𝑌
0 = 0.8 and 𝑆0 = 0.2, the magnitude of 𝐸?̃? is calculated given value ranges of 
Ω and 𝜎 and a particular 𝛾. Again, as the literature suggests, the shadow price of credits in 
imperfect credit markets is at least twice as large as the bank interest rate and can be as high as 




5.7 times as large (Sial & Carter, 1996). We plot 𝐸?̃? for 𝛾 = 2, 3, 4, and 6 in figure 4.3. For 
easier interpretation, we measure 𝐸?̃? in percentage form.  
The lower the efficiency of credit markets for smallholders, the higher the relative EV for urban 
households tends to be if transforming to large-farm production. The relative EV also increases 
in the marketing margin of smallholders and the efficiency of hired labor on large farms. When 
𝛾 ranges from 3 to 6, 𝐸?̃? is likely to account for as much as 4-8% of the total expenditure of 
urban households.  
 
Figure 4.3 Equivalent Variation for Urban Households 
Notes: Authors’ calculation. The red hyperplane represents the value of relative EV for a particular (Ω, 𝜎) and 𝛾 =
2. Similarly, the green hyperplane represents the value of relative EV for a particular (Ω, 𝜎) and 𝛾 = 3, the blue 
hyperplane corresponds to 𝛾 = 4, and the gray hyperplane corresponds to 𝛾 = 6. The white hyperplane indicates 
𝐸?̃? = 0. Except for the red hyperplane, all hyperplanes are strictly above the white hyperplane.  
 
Social Welfare Changes 
There are two to consider social welfare change. First, we compare 𝑅𝑢 and 𝐸𝑉. When 𝑅𝑢 < 1 
and 𝐸𝑉 > 0, we have a win-win scenario where both urban and rural households gain from the 
transformation of smallholder farms. If 𝑅𝑢 > 1 and 𝐸𝑉 < 0, of course, we have a lose-lose 
scenario and so on. In figure 4.4, we draw a red hyperplane which represents 𝑅𝑢 = 1 and a 
yellow hyperplane which represents 𝐸𝑉 = 0 . Combinations of ( Ω, 𝜎, 𝛾 ) below the red 
hyperplane and above the yellow hyperplane represents the win-win scenario.  
 
 





Figure 4.4 Welfare Changes of the Two Types of Households 
Notes: Authors’ calculation. The red hyperplane represents 𝑅𝑢 = 1, while the yellow hyperplane represents 𝐸𝑉 =
0. The gray plane contains all points with 𝛾 = 1. 
 
We can view this figure better by cutting the space along a particular value of 𝜎. For example, 
if we cut through 𝜎 = 0.75 and 𝜎 = 0.65, we can separate scenarios into four areas in the figure 
below. In figure 4.5 (a), the green area on the right represents the win-win scenario. The light 
green area on the top represents a scenario where only urban households gain, while the light 
green area on the bottom represents a scenario where only rural households gain. The remaining 
white area refers to the lose-lose scenario which is much smaller relative to the sum of the other 
three scenarios.  
Figure 4.5 (b) shows a similar pattern for a smaller 𝜎. The area of the win-win scenario enlarges 
as 𝜎, the marketing efficiency of smallholders decreases. In fact, when 𝜎 = 0.65, there is no 
lose-lose scenario within ranges of our parameters. This means when the cost of marketing is 
relatively large for smallholders, the transformation of smallholder farming tends to benefit 
both rural and urban households.  





  (a)        (b) 
Figure 4.5 Welfare Changes of the Two Types of Households 
Notes: Authors’ calculation. Figure (a) is drawn given 𝜎 = 0.75, and Figure (b) is drawn given 𝜎 = 0.65. The 
green area on the right represents the win-win scenario (i.e., 𝑅𝑢 < 1, 𝐸𝑉 > 0), while the light green area on the 
top represents a scenario where only urban households gain (i.e., 𝑅𝑢 > 1, 𝐸𝑉 > 0). The light green area on the 
bottom represents a scenario where only rural households gain (i.e., 𝑅𝑢 < 1, 𝐸𝑉 < 0), while the remaining white 
area refers to the lose-lose scenario (i.e., 𝑅𝑢 > 1, 𝐸𝑉 < 0).  
 
 Alternatively, we compute the total welfare of all households in the economy following 
equation (5). Expressing 𝑆1 by a function of the observed 𝑆0, we rewrite 𝑊𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 as 
2 [
(1 − + 2𝛽)𝛽
1 − /𝛾 + 2𝛽
+ (1 − − 𝛽) − 𝜎 + 𝜎 /𝛾] 
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) (Ω𝜓 − 1)]   
The magnitude of 𝑊𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 is independent of the proportion of rural households (i.e.,𝜙) in the 
economy. If 𝑊𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 > 0 . The economy as a whole gains from the transformation of 
smallholder farmers. Even if only rural or urban households gain under 𝑊𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 > 0 , the 
government could make income transfers across households to make Pareto improvement for 
all.  
Again, we compute 𝑊𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  by varying magnitudes of key parameters. Note 𝜎𝐿 needs to be 
specified in this case. We set 𝜎𝐿 = 0.9 in the baseline simulation. It turns out that 𝑊
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 is 
only marginally affected by the value 𝜎𝐿. We plot 𝑊
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙for 𝛾 = 2, 3, 4, and 6 in figure 4.6. 
The value of 𝑊𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 increases in 𝛾. Importantly, 𝑊𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 is positive as long as 𝛾 > 3. Thus, 




the transformation of smallholder farms is likely to bring Pareto improvement to the economy 
given general economic conditions in smallholder-based agricultural economies.  
 
Figure 4.6 Total Welfare Change of the Two Types of Households 
Notes: Authors’ calculation. The red hyperplane represents the value of 𝑊𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  for a particular (Ω, 𝜎) and 𝛾 = 2. 
Similarly, the green hyperplane corresponds to 𝛾 = 3, the blue hyperplane corresponds to 𝛾 = 4, and the gray 
hyperplane corresponds to 𝛾 = 6. The white hyperplane indicates 𝑊𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 0.  
  




4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study extends the Ma-Sexton model and assesses how the welfare of domestic consumers 
changes when rural smallholder farming transitions to selling or renting landholdings and 
supplying labor to larger commercial farms. We add to the literature by looking into the effects 
of when the increased output is directed towards staple commodities sold in the home country 
market. Through a range of plausible parameters, our simulation results suggest that urban 
consumers and rural households can benefit through this transformation, in particular low-
income households who tend to spend more income on staple food. 
First, we show that the production and consumption of staple food by urban consumers is higher 
under large farm production. Second, both rural and urban households pay lower prices for 
staple food under the large farm scenario. The price decrease of staples enables an extra sum of 
expenditure that is used to purchase food from other food groups that have higher levels of 
income elasticity. In addition to the increased livelihood options for smallholders, poor urban 
consumers can intuitively, as a result, buy staple commodities at a lower price, improving their 
overall diet. Lastly, we show that as intermediary costs (σ) decreases, which is often the case 
under commercial farm operations, the cost of marketing lowers. This leads to an increasing 
win-win situation for both rural and urban households. 
Understanding the relationship between increased farm production due to land consolidation 
and the effect of urban household’s food security has many relevant policy implications. With 
rapid population and income growth in developing countries, there are concerns as to how to 
meet the rising demand for food and the food security status of the poor. Though new market 
opportunities for the farming sectors are arising along with economic development, much of 
the urban food consumption demands in African countries are becoming dependent on imports 
(FAO, 2011), thus, increasing their vulnerability to world market shocks. 
The transformation to commercial agriculture is possible if supportive institutions are in place, 
as shown by the rapid transformation that has taken place in high-value export sectors (Ma & 
Sexton, forthcoming). Though much of domestic institutions and international donors’ policies 
emphasize the important role of smallholder farming in economic development and poverty 
reduction, our findings shed light on the effects of the emergence of larger farms. Our results 
imply that if this transition is enabled, then both small farming households and urban consumers 
can gain from increased income due to higher levels of farm productivity. The findings of this 
paper provide the first step to encourage governments in developing countries to not only loosen 
restrictions on land consolidation but to also implement programs targeted at consolidating 
farmlands to increase output productivity and to reduce poverty and hunger in the long run. 





Observed Expenditure Share of the Staple Food 
Expenditure share under smallholder production and large-farm production can be expressed 
















The relative EV is rewritten as 
𝐸?̃? = 𝑆0 (
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Thus, the EV based on the Slutsky compensated demand is 
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In the past decades, there has been a rapid expansion of global value chains across the world.  
Several factors are driving this development, such as increasing income, urbanization, and 
improved infrastructure (Reardon et al., 2003). At the same time, food supply chains are 
upgrading to meet demands with mechanisms to document testing procedures to ensure food 
safety and improvements of processing facilities and storage systems (Maertens et al., 2012). 
This has created opportunities for the agrifood sector in developing countries to participate in 
modern value chains.  Yet, in the course of this process, many smallholders who participate in 
these value chains still face challenges that prevent them from benefitting from these 
opportunities.  Studies have shown that with the presence and support of institutions, there are 
benefits to countries as a whole and for smallholder households in terms of agricultural 
productivity (Fulginiti et al., 2004; M. Lio & Liu, 2008) and participation in global value chains 
(Dollar et al., 2016). This dissertation addresses this phenomenon by assessing the role of 
institutions in the integration and development of modern agricultural value chains. Chapters 2 
to 4 present the three papers that define the central focus of this dissertation.   
Chapter 2 presents the first paper titled “The role of institutional quality on the performance in 
the export of coconut products” aimed to answer three research questions.  First, we are 
interested in how the overall institutional environment in exporting countries affects the 
bilateral trade of coconut products.  Second, we look into whether improvements in the 
exporters’ individual indicator scores lead to an increase in trade with consideration to the 
exporters’ and importers’ overall institutional setting.  Lastly, we investigate the effects of 
institutional similarities for coconut trade and its different compositions of value addition. To 
address these questions, we utilize structural gravity models to measure how institutional 
quality affects the export performance of the top 26 coconut producing countries to the top 15 
importing economies over the years 1996-2016. Our results suggest that increased government 
effectiveness enhances trade of high-value products, hinting that further processing of coconut 
products is enabled by the provision of contract enforcement and complementary services. 
Conversely, better voice and accountability scores decrease the trade of coconut products in 
both categories of value addition, implying that more voice and rights to farmers and laborers 
could complicate the value-adding process and border trading of coconut products. 
The third chapter investigates the challenges and opportunities of a small island nation’s 
integration into the global value chain with an emphasis on the role of institutions titled “Fiji’s 
participation in the global coconut value chain: Opportunities and constraints”. This chapter 





first follows the previous paper and looks into the effect of institutional indicators on the 
performance in the export of coconut products from Fiji. The empirical results show that 
increased scores in the government effectiveness and voice and accountability indicators 
enhance coconut exports from Fiji, suggesting that institutional quality in the home country 
plays an important role. Second, I conducted semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders 
in the Fijian coconut sector. The interviews reveal that communications among each 
stakeholder group are fragmented. The main institutional actors and the producers have 
different perceptions of the industry’s challenges, thus resulting in different ideas on how to 
address the issues. Interviews further confirm that the existing value chain is rudimentary and 
limited to low-value products such as copra and crude oil. The existing land tenure system 
creates further disincentives for smallholders to invest time and energy in managing coconut 
groves and replanting.       
Chapter 4 of my dissertation takes a theoretical approach to look into modern agricultural 
systems by analyzing the demand side.  It follows the overall storyline of this dissertation by 
emphasizing the importance of institutions and what could happen if institutions enabled 
smallholders to end farm operations to supply land and labor inputs to larger commercialized 
farms.  The paper builds on previous research (Ma & Sexton, forthcoming) that assess the future 
of smallholder farming systems in modern agricultural value chains. We address the 
unanswered questions as to how the productivity effect can affect the welfare of domestic 
consumers if the increased output is directed towards staple crops sold in the home country. 
Furthermore, we show how lower prices from increased production can improve the dietary 
diversity of urban consumers. Since poorer urban households are likely to have high budget 
shares yet low-income elasticities for staple crops, they benefit when the price of staples 
decreases as a result of commercialization.  Consumption of other food groups expands, thus, 
enhancing dietary diversity and likely the nutritional health of the urban poor.  
Some general conclusions and implications can be drawn from the results of these chapters.  
First, we confirm that institutions matter, but not merely as one entity.  Different aspects of 
institutional quality affect integration differently.  When assessing coconut producing countries 
collectively, the findings of our first paper in Chapter 2 suggest that government effectiveness 
matters the most when enhancing trade of coconut products of varying degrees of value edition, 
while the indicator, voice and accountability, had contrasting effects.  However, findings from 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that for Fiji, a small island economy, both government effectiveness 
and voice and accountability increase Fiji’s export of coconut products.  This implies that the 
heterogeneities of each country play a role and must be taken into consideration for future 





research.  Results from the third chapter bolster this argument.  Each country has its specific 
institutional set-up and enabling environment, thus, the integration of each will differ albeit to 
a lesser or greater degree than another. 
Results from chapter 4 show that through a range of plausible parameters, urban consumers 
benefit when the price of staples decreases as a result of farm commercialization.  The price 
decrease of staples enables simplicity extra income for households to spend on foods that have 
higher levels of income elasticity, such as animal proteins.  Our findings support the argument 
that though government policies and international donors’ support for smallholder farms often 
stem from egalitarian reasons, there are benefits for both smallholders and urban poor 
consumers if land transfers are allowed from small to commercial farms.  This is particularly 
the case when supplies home countries are becoming increasingly unable to meet rising quantity 
demands. 
5.1 Limitations and Reflections 
I dove into the dark when I picked coconut as the commodity to study to fit my GlobalFood 
subproject topic. The coconut sector is largely ignored in the literature and I became convinced 
that the boom in organic and other certified coconut products in the Western market would 
prove to be fruitful in research. The research on coconuts provides interesting insights as to 
how this very specific commodity plays a role in people’s livelihoods.  Furthermore, it sheds 
light on how the attitude towards this crop varies largely depending on the opportunity 
smallholders and processors have in the region.  I hope my work will encourage future research 
work on the economics of the coconut sector. Writing the paper in Chapter 4 is equally 
ambitious as microeconomic theory and analysis were not my strong points.  Yet, I felt like the 
topic is important and relevant. The learning curve is high and the thought of going into 
unknown territory sparked the motivation in me.  These decisions proved to be worth the risk. 
Nonetheless, there are some limitations and important lessons learned throughout this process. 
In the following section, I discuss the lessons I have learned in the journey to writing the three 
chapters of my dissertation as well as some reflections and thoughts.  
Paper I 
One major limitation in the first paper of my dissertation was the unavailability of data.  Though 
coconut products are sold widely in developed countries, trade data remains limited. This 
proved to be a bottleneck once the ball started rolling on this paper.  





One of the original ideas when I began this Ph.D., is to look at how agricultural policies can 
affect the integration of coconut markets. It’s unfortunate that the database for Distortions to 
Agricultural Incentives is only compiled up to 2007.  If data from later years were also, it would 
then be possible to assess how institutions and policy together can influence how much coconut 
(or other commodities) trade there is. The agrifood system has drastically altered in 13 years. 
Due to the attention and relevance of policy implications of research nowadays, it would be 
crucial to assess the role of specific policies on value chain integration. 
The United Nations Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) has one of the most 
comprehensive datasets in commodity trade.  However, the data is limited to the six digits in 
the Harmonized System (HS) codes.  As a result, products with higher levels of value addition 
are clustered into broad categories such as “fresh or dried, desiccated”.  Coconut items such as 
virgin coconut oil, coconut water, and coconut milk belong in the eight-digit codes.  This first 
chapter tries to deal with this by assuming that the coconut producing countries in the study do 
not export items such as almond milk and hazelnut milk. We can only speculate if the results 
would be different had eight-digit codes data been available, perhaps the differences could be 
in the margins.  
This paper is also limited by the inability to address the heterogeneities among and within 
coconut producing countries. I emphasize the role of transaction costs as channels that influence 
international exchange.  We thus neglect that transaction costs vary not only with institutional 
quality but also with human capital per worker (Costinot, 2009). A handful of countries 
dominate coconut production. The nations range from large economies like Brazil to small ones 
such as Kiribati with smallholders who depend on the cultivation of coconuts for their 
livelihoods. Our version of the gravity model tries to address some heterogeneities by 
implementing importer fixed effects.  However, issues such as within-country heterogeneities 
are not captured.  
We attempt to measure how institutions affect products with different levels of value addition.  
However, institutional indicators do not allow for the assessment of product categories 
individually. We have in part addressed this by showing the trade effect for the entire 
agricultural sector.  Nevertheless, in a macro-level study, we are unable to identify winners and 
losers individually with institutional indicators that assess the entire economy. Our study 
focuses exclusively on coconut exports, therefore, our findings should not be seen as 
transferrable to other crops and commodities.  Further research is needed in other agricultural 
products with various levels of value addition to study the influence of institutions and 
governance on international market integration.   





Dealing with multilateral resistance in the study’s version of the gravity model is a major 
challenge and a major roadblock in writing the second chapter.  In an earlier version of the 
paper, we implemented importer-time-product fixed effects, exporter-product fixed effects, and 
time-product fixed effects with the intention of characteristics that are not observed over time 
per exporter, per importer, and per product in the basic model (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 
2003).  Yet, as Fally (2015), points out, in the PPML model, the inclusion of exporter-year fixed 
effects synonymous with conditioning on the total value of exports in the given year.  As a 
result, only the relative trade costs are identified (Yotov, 2012).  Whether institutions increase 
the overall coconut exports evenly cannot be identified because the institutional variable only 
varies at the exporter-year level.  In the end, the bonus-vetus method (Baier & Bergstrand, 2009) 
is to be the best way to address multilateral resistance for the purpose of this paper.        
Lastly, there is no question in the importance of studying institutions and the role it has on trade 
and integration. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to find a database that is able to fully undertake 
the notion of “institutions”.  
Paper II 
The second paper of my dissertation stems from my desire to gain a deeper understanding of 
the challenges that face smallholders who engage in coconut production.  The field research 
involves qualitative methods, which has shown to have several limitations for analysis from an 
economic standpoint.  The aim is to understand their perceptions.  However, the lack of 
quantitative data does pose restraints. First, it is challenging to avoid researcher bias when 
conducting interviews and data analysis. It is difficult to determine and assess the systematic 
reasoning for farmer’s participation in copra making. All information was obtained according 
to word of mouth, therefore, it does imply problems regarding the internal validity of the study.  
However, because there are no clear definitions nor indicators as to what poses constraints to a 
specific commodity sector, the study had to rely on qualitative interviews with actors in the 
industry.   
My ambition to conduct this qualitative research alone proved to be more difficult than I had 
anticipated. The decision to go to Fiji stemmed from a collaboration with CIRAD to produce a 
manual on risk assessment of coconut value chains in the Pacific Islands. Because of this 
cooperation, the time of travel had to be in sync with the staff member at CIRAD.  Though I 
did receive generous support from the team at the Ministry of Agriculture, I underestimated the 
difficulty of conducting semi-interviews and discussions alone.  Also, since the participants 
were mainly selected by ministry staff, it perhaps biased some perceptions over others.  Local 





staff members in Fiji and the international organization I worked with possess good knowledge 
of navigating the islands and how to communicate with farmers.  Through this, I learned that it 
is valuable to know the strengths of each organization in the field and utilize them for my 
purposes.  
In this paper, I assume that smallholders can benefit from their participation in global value 
chains. We were unable to assess how much of an increase in income would be for coconut 
producers if they could participate in the global market. A future research question could be in 
what conditions do farmers benefit from integration into global value chains?  The idea that 
farmers would benefit if they were able to produce higher-value products and integrate globally 
is ambiguous.  Whereas Maertens and Swinnen (2009) show that incomes in Senegal increased 
with increasing production of high-value products for exports, Schipmann and Qaim's (2010) 
research on sweet peppers in Thailand shows no difference in income when smallholder sell to 
modern supply chains as opposed to traditional markets.  
I encountered difficulties during the analysis and writing phase.  I, of course, knew that people 
who specialize in qualitative research is limited in Goettingen.  Thus, I had my struggles and 
battles that I hadn’t foreseen.  I finished the paper with a great and relevant story, but I 
nonetheless encountered difficulties to present it in a scientific manner. 
Paper III 
The study considers a partial equilibrium model with no product differentiation.  We also 
assume the price to be exogenous. The limitations, thus, are the lack of consideration for product 
differentiation, exogenous variables such as climate variations, and assessment of the effect on 
other markets. As Carletto et al. (2015) point out if there is a household level influence of 
agriculture and nutrition or in the paper’s purpose, food security, “they are most likely the result 
of one or a combination of these factors—higher agricultural income, market imperfections 
(resulting in greater consumption of own consumption) and gender-related factors” (p. 949).  
There is a tradeoff when taking a partial equilibrium approach as opposed to using a general 
equilibrium model.  We look into detail about the effect of the food sector.  By doing this, we 
omit the possibilities of the substitution effect on non-agricultural items.  For instance, in urban 
areas, there is a higher share of indirect consumption from cereal grains in processed forms 
(Valin et al., 2014). Furthermore, processed goods are likely to be more elastic to income than 
raw commodities (Valin et al., 2014). 
Our model does not take intra-household heterogeneities into account.  A unitary model could 
inaccurately represent households’ decisions when treating households as a single decision unit 





maximizing a common utility function (Attanasio & Lechene, 2014). Different consumption 
patterns and preferences over how extra income should be spent may lead to a difference in 
both income and price elasticities (De Vreyer et al., 2020).   
The study relies on past papers to obtain figures for the price elasticity of demand for staple 
commodities in developing countries. The literature utilized in the paper nonetheless had their 
limitations that might lead to biases in the numbers. The countries of focus for these studies are 
also limited.  Though our focus is in developing countries, the majority of the studies were in 
more or less the same countries.  We added Brazil and South Africa to the study because the 
studies involved seemed reliable.   
Lastly, the paper assumes that an increase in consumption of other food items leads to an 
increase in food security.  This model ignores gender dynamics in households. Some evidence 
hints that depending on the household members that control the resources, the effects of changes 
in income will differ (Quisumbing, 2003). Food security itself is a difficult concept to define 
fully.  This implicates the type of proxies that should be measured as food security—food, 
caloric, micronutrient, or dietary diversity indicators. 
5.2 Future Research Agenda 
A span of three years was a limited amount of time to achieve what one hopes out of a Ph.D.  
There were more ideas and that could not be realized due to time constraints.  This sets up a 
good setting for some future research prospects. First, since the third paper is fresh in memory, 
I would like to extend the analysis of this paper with a general equilibrium framework and study 
the economy-wide impacts of conversion to modern agricultural markets and value where the 
demand functions are based on end consumption of household items (Valin et al., 2014).  One 
cannot address the concept of food security without exploring the dietary and nutritional 
diversity of urban consumers. As mentioned already, the challenge is to find the correct proxy 
for the analysis. Additionally, I am interested in proposing an additional consideration of the 
current model that explicitly studies spatial effects and urban consumer’s distance to the market. 
Secondly, subject to data availability, there is much left to explore in smallholders in the global 
coconut sector and how it relates to the smallholders who are involved. Though the craze has 
lessened, there persists a market for high-value coconut items. For instance, it would be 
interesting to compare the market of virgin coconut oil versus coconut oil. Various brands of 
both items can be found on the market, but, very little data exist in how much of each is being 
traded globally. Furthermore, though much of high-value coconut products found in Western 





supermarkets have one or more standard or certifications, there is limited data that exist on 
coconut certification and standards. If data were available, then it would be worthwhile to look 
at how dynamics between institutions and certifications obtained by smallholder farmers.   
Another idea that I would like to work on in the future is the concept of food waste in low-
income countries.  With urbanization and rising incomes can also result in an increase in 
inequality.  How does change the perceptions of people’s attitudes towards food waste?  
Additionally, if according to the findings of Chapter 4, the urban poor consumes more staple 
food and diversify their diets into other food groups, does this also increase the amount of food 
wasted? The findings of such a study would have high policy implications. 
Finally, these last three years of Ph.D. life have taught me a lot about the world of conducting 
research and publishing these works. Beyond research and empirical skills and training, I 
learned the importance of communications across cultures and the importance of patience and 
composure.  I entered with higher levels of idealism and I will leave with those same ideals 
combined with some realism. Nonetheless, I have my idealistic yearnings for my career vision 
in the next several years.  I wish to utilize my policy background and sociological thinking and 
combine them with my economic training and skills to develop innovative empirical studies 
and direct research projects that focus on the welfare impacts of policies and programs on 
smallholder farmers and rural households. Specifically, I wish to address the mechanisms in 
which smallholders can benefit from deeper integration into global value chains and how the 
rest of society could gain from potential spill-over effects. I want to reach further than being a 
research scientist.  I aim to be part of a force that aims to implement on the ground projects that 
value local and indigenous knowledge.  Ultimately, I wish to work with people in the field who 
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